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Minnesota has just began one of its biggest welfare overhauls ever through the state's
new policy: The Minnesota Family Investment-statewide (MFIP-S). The Federal welfare policy

reform, Temporary Assistance for Needy families (TANF), initiated this revamp and has shifted
focus to temporary assistance and mandatory work requirements for welfare participants. The
employment and training component of the MFIP-S policy is currently being implemented and
has proven to play an important role in this major effort that

will affect thousands of people.

This paper analyzes the employment and training component of MFIP-S, specifically
concentrating on how it will affect single-mothers. The following research question is posed:

Will the employment and training component of MFIP-S effectively meet the intended goals of
welfare reform for single-mothers? The analysis found strengths in this policy, including
intense job search assistance and a needy job market for workers, but also found weakness',

such as unrealistic time limits and lack of a safety net for children. The findings indicate that
there will be several intended policy goals achieved, but that poverty will increase and many

will be unable to find and maintain suitable employment. Implications for the future and social
work practice are discussed.
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Chapter

I: Introduction

History
"The welfare reform debate in this counfiy reflects a dilemma identified as long ago

as

the 16th century English Poor Laws: Is it possible to assist poor people without, by that very
act, giving them incentives for behavior that perpehrates poverty and dependency" (Gueron,
1995,
are

p.7)? For 60 years the U,S. welfare

system has provided cash payme*ts to families who

poor. In 1935, Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) was drafted

as a part of the Social

Security Act and was intended to enable single mothers to stay home and care for their children
because women were not encouraged to work (Gueron, 1995). tn 1962, ADC became Aid to

Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and extended coverage to families that had a male
present (Reckers, Pile, Larson,

& Fonkert, L997). In 1940,

urere children with deceased fathers;

4ATo

of those receiving benefits

by tgTT divorced, separated, deserted,

and unmarried

parents increased to over SAVI of recipients (Rein, lgBZ).
Factors such as eligibility expansion and the inclusion of employable males, coupled

with the increasing number of women in the work force began a change in the attitude toward
welfare policy (Lamer, Terman,

& Behrman, 1997). Many

began to believe that these clients

were undeserving, should he restrained from receiving public assistance, and should be forced

to work.

h

1967, Congress made its first major effort to encourage work and reduce

dependency (Reckers et al., 1997). Since then many programs such as the Work Incentive

(WIN) Program and the Job Opportunities and Basic Skitts (JOBS) Program have disappointed
policy makers (Crueron, 1995). Once again, the welfare system is going through a major
overhaul and many changes will be made affecting millions if not all Americans. The Federal
goveflrment is drawing what could be its hardest line yet on welfare.
Congress has now declared that welfare

will be a. program of temporary

assistance, not

a lifetime entitlement. The new Federal law replaces AFDC with a block grant program called

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Now, each state will be provided with a
lump-sum appropriation grant to be used for welfare spending (Reckers et al., 1gg7).
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Overvierv of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families {TANF)
The nerp focus of welfare is

work. This dramatic reconstructing of the Nation's welfare

system came when the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
became law in August

of 1996 (Larner et al., L997). The arangements between

Federal government are being revamped, and eligible populations

states and the

ire being redefined.

According to Reckers et al. (1997) under the law:

1. Most people on assistance must work.

2.

For the first time, limits are placed on how long people can receive assistance.

3.

Federal money to states is set at a certain amount instead of automatically increa.sing

a.s

more

people enter the welfare rolls.

4.

States are penalized for not reaching Federal goals in getting people to work.

5.

Certain able-bodied adults will have their benefits reduced or eliminated.

This ne'w law is intended to reduce welfare dependency and promote personal responsibility. It
also gives states greater flexibility in designing and administering welfare spending, but they

must meet the goals of the new Federal law or face consequences. All state plans must have
heen submitted by July 1, 1997 and must have specified the stategy planned to

order to impose work requirements and

fulfill other Federal conditions.

States that meet work requirements

will

(Reckers et aI., t997)

will be rewarded under TANF and those that do not

be penalized by losing a portion of their TANF

ZSVI

be used in

grant. After one year of implementation,

of state welfare recipients must work, or a five percent loss of federal funds will be

imposed with an increase of trpo percent each year. This law also places a national five year

lifetime limit on receipt of TANF, but states can enforce a shorter time limit. This reflects the
philosophy that welfare is a temporary means of support only for when adults are trying to find
employment and achieve self-sufficiency. The law does, however, allow states to exempt 20To

of their caseloads from the time limits if there is sufficient evidence of hardship. Without TAI.{F,

it was projected that nation rvide spending in Federally funded welfare progranrs was expected
to grow nearly 50Vo over the next seven years, reform will slow itto 3580. (Reckers et al., L997)
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Olterview of Minnesota Fa$ily lnvestment Prosram - Statewide (MFIP-S)
Specifically in Minnesota, 268 million dollars in TANF grants each year will be
appropriated by the Federal government for six yea.rs. Ttris new law will limit state
administrative spending to

LSVa

of the total grant amount--about $40 million, close to what

Minnesota is currently spending. Minnesota must also keep its state funded welfare spending
level at 80 Ta, or more if the state elects, of what it spent on AFDC in 1994 which comes to
$166 million. (Reckers et al.,

t997)

So what is Minnesota's plan and answer to TANF?

Minnesota's answer to the Federal government's new law is the Minnesota Family
lnvestrnent Program - Statewide (MFIP-S). In 1993, the Depanment of Human Services
received fuoding from the Minnesota legislature to begin operation of an AFDC weHare to work

pilot program in several counties known as the Minnesota Family lnvestment Ptan (lUfP).
MI|IP combined three programs: AFDC, Family General Assistance (FGA), and Food Stamps.
The goals of MIIIP were to reward work, emphasize personal responsihility, support families,
and simplify the welfare system. (Miller, Knox, Auspos, Hunter-Marrls,

& Orenstein,

1997),

During the week of August 19, L996,just prior to the enactrnent of TANF, the
Department of Human Services received Federal approval of a waiver request to operate MFIP
statewide as the Minnesota Family Investment Program-Staterride (MFIP-S) (Reckers et al.,

1997). This meant that Minnesota had Federal approval to operate MFIP as its welfare policy
program under TANF. Recipients, however, will still be subjected to the provisions of TAII{F,

which are not inconsistent with MIrIP-S. (Bellis, 1996).
Beginning July L,1997,58,000 families in the state on AFDC or MFIP will come under
new statewide welfare policy. All but 207o of these families will face a Federal five year

lifetime timit on cash benefits. Under TANF, MFIP-S must meet Federat goals or lose part of
Federal funds.

In 1998, 25Vo of all families that are not exempt and

are not already working

must participate in work or work-related activities for at least 20 hours per week. Close to

12,000 families in the state must be engaged in work in order for the state to meet these Federat

guidelines. The Federal govemment also requires thxT|To of two-parent families must he

participating in work activities by the end

of

IggT.It is expected that O*"urru*lf Minnesota,s

good economy and educated welfare population that it will be in a better position than marry
states. (Reckers et al., t997)
The Reserurcher's Interest
The researcher's interest in welfare policy does not stem from personal or professional

experience, but from the fact that the researcher lacks knowledge concerning this large and

contoversial issue, The new laws surrounding cu-rrent welfare reform are the first of its kind
and will have a major affect on malry Americans and to some extent all of us. In the state of

Minnesota alone close to 60,000 people will face a sfficter more rigorous work policy. The
concenEation of this paper is on the Minnesota welfare policy
paper

only.

More specifically, this

will analyze the employment and naining component of MFIP-S and how it will affect

single-mother participants who are over 20 years old (not a minor), American citizens, and not
pregnant.
Employment and Traininq Component of MFIP-S
ltrIhat is the policy conceming the employment and training component of MFIP-S and

why is it being implemented? Congress has declared a new congact with welfare recipients,
one of which work

will be expected in return for pubtic benefits. Because most women with

children, 70To in Minnesota, now work outside the home, those on welfare witl he e:rpected to
do the same (Gueron, 1995). Welfare will no longer be considered a "free ride". Minnesota
does, however, realize thatg}Vo of persons on welfare are single-parents and will need
necessary supports in order to become independent. Some of these supports include: child
care, health ca.re, transportation, and job search assistance. In the Appendix, there is a copied

version of the official policy on MFIP-S's employment and training component including only
the aspects that will be analyzed in this paper. The analysis will address the following question:

lVill the employment and taining component of MFIP-S effectively meet the intended goals of
welfare reform for single-mothers?
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Chapter

II: A Review of the Literature

Theoretic aUConceptual Framework

Labor Force Attachment Theory
Researchers and theorists have attempted to explain long-term welfare dependency for

decades. These theories and explanations, as well as societal views, have shaped the decisions of
the policymakers who wrote the new welfare reform policy (Larner et al., L9971. As this policy
begins to be implemented, time will tell whether or not predictions were correct and if new efforts
moYe recipients

off welfare and into economic self-sufficiency. One of the leading theories that

it is-believed to have played a major role in the shaping of weHare reform policy is labor force
attachment theory (Mclanahan

& Garfinkel, 1989; Mead,

1994).

Labor force attachment theory a*ssumes that the more connected a person is with the labor
force the more chances they have of gaining access to valued resources andlor power in the

future. It also assumes that those who are not attached to the labor force, either directly or
indirecflyr are very likely to be poor or to be involved in some form of criminal activity
(Mclanahan & Garfinkel, 1989). This theory is based on the belief that the longer persons have
been on weHare and disengaged from the work force the longer and more difficult it

will be for

them to become attached to the labor force, thereby, contributing to the persistence of their longterm dependency on welfare. Some express concem that weak labor force attachment
undermines the work ethic reducing productivity, whereas others worry that it undermines the

solidarity of the work force and reduces the likelihood of successful collective action (Jacobsen

& Levin, 1995), This theory supporls a conviction

that poverty may be due, not so much to a

lack of opportunitY, fls to a lack of enforcement of social nonns such as the work ethic (Mead,

t994). Welfare reform attempts to reinstate this social norrn of rvork ethic. Thus the hypothesis
is that

if welfare policy

can get recipients to become attached to the labor force, therehy

employing them, then there will be less dependency on public benefits. Welfare reform policy is
influenced by labor force attachment theoty because of its emphasis on employment. Welfare

policy also shows increased concern with those who are more unattached from the labor force.
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Long-term but employable poor comprise almost one-third of all needy in a given year
and receive the greatest afiention hecause they are the most controversial politicalty (Mead,

1994). The majority of the long-term welfare recipients live in female-headed households.
Female-headedness and nonwork frequenfly occur together and their dependency typically lasts

longer than it usually does for other persons on welfare; that is why their poverty is prolonged
(Mead, 1994). Female-headedness and nonwork often means both dependency and weak labor

force attachment. The greatest emphasis for welfare reform is female-headed, long-term,
nonwork recipients.
Along with weak labor force attachment comes persistence of poverty and social
isolation (Mclanahan & Garfinkel, 1989). Persistent poverfy may occur either overtime, or it
may occur across generations, as when a child of a welfare recipient also becomes dependent on

welfare (Clausen & Gilens, 1990). This shows that the ability to become independent could
prove to be more difficult for persons who have been persistently poor, especially those who
have been poor across generations. Mother-only families have proved to be a particular concem
because they appear to have longer periods of dependence and are more likely to come from

generational poverty (Mclanahan

& Garfinkel, 1989). Weak lahor force

attachment is a theory

that has evolved with the belief that women should work, unlike past beliefs that women should
care

for children. It has heen recognized that these women are exEemely unattached from the

labor force.
"Isolation is a mechanism by which weak labor force attachment persists over time and
across generations" (Mclanahan

& Garfinkel,

1989, p.

96). If a person

has weak Iabor force

attachment, then she is more likely to be isolated from society. Ttris isolation furttrer adds to the
persistence of weak labor force attachment, which perpetuates further poverty and dependence.

Wilson and his colleagues (1989) described urban ghettos as communities with few employment
opportunities and lacking attachment to the larger society (Mclanahan

& Garfinkel,

1989).

Isolation is a key aspect of labor force attachment theory. By attaching people to the labor force,
welfare policy is also pulling them into the world and out of isolation.
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Employment and Economic Prospects
To anticipate the likely or unlikely success of welfare reform efforts to promote
employment among welfare recipients, policymakers cafl consider studies that frace the
transitions that people (mostly women) will make between welfare and work, as well as evaluate

prograrns. Findings from past research studies can assist with predicting what qualifications
welfare recipients have to offer, what the availability of jobs is like in the laborforce, what the
costs are of working for welfare recipients, as well as what job stability is likely for these job

seekers, This review examines the issues surrounding moving those who rely on weHare into
private-sector employment.

Employability,

In order for people to find jobs, they must convince someone to hire them. They must
prove that they have what it takes to do the

job.

Studies documenting the characteristics

weHare recipients suggest that it is doubtful fhat all seekere will find

market (Lamer et al.,

a

of

job in the regular job

t997). From physical health problems to mental health problems

education, job skills, motivation, and experience, there are many debates over what

as well as

will affect

weHare recipient employability. Almost half of the mothers who began receiving welfare

n

1992

had not completed high school, and a majority of those performed poorly on basic life skills tests
(Larner et al., L9971. Some programs have attempted to increase employment with education and
vocational taining but as Nightingale and Holcomb (1997\ found these approaches have had

little success and are exfremely costly. Other prograrns have focused not on education but
speedy employment and job naining which may decrease trnemployment but it rarely made a

difference in the long run and few were really benefiting? There have been mixed findings in the
research regarding which approach seems to enhance the fastest most cost-effmtive

employabitity of welfare recipients. As the issue of employability is explored, it is important to
consider not only short-term hut long-term gains considering lifetime employability of p€rsons

who are at risk for welfare dependency. The lack of skills among AFDC recipients proves to be
another problem that mu-st be explored (Holzer, L997).

I
\Uhat is knorryn from many studies is that certain personal characteristics generally have
a positive affect on work

effort. These characteristics include: having a high school education,

a

work history, a marketable skill, few children of older ages, and the ability to eam a reasonable
hourly wage (Rein, 1982). It is undebatable that typical adult weHare recipients are young
women who have few job skills, limited schooling, and low scores on standardized tests of ability
and achievement (Burtless, L997: Gueron, 1995; Nightingale

& Holcomb, 1997). tn Table

1

(shown on this page), information was gathered from the annual NLSY survey that showed how
women who were the least dependent on AFDC had higher educations and scored better on the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) (Burtless , 1997).
Table

1

Eftrcdimal Anainrmt

d

Abniry Sffi€s of

ffirmerisics

z+Yeu{lH Wm, by AFDC Smls

tfumher of lrfoffis Rmfoved AIDC

rrrtlrs

1-ll nnlhr

SVo

3qo

9ZTo

Less than four years of high school

5?Vo

44Vo

I47o

Four yeffs of high school

35

48

40

One to three years of college

T7,

I

24

Four or more yea$ of college

0

0

22

12

tfrotWminftury

Home

Ehrcatimat Anainmeatby ASe 25

Corymlte ScffiE m 198{I Ad

Fsces qdifrcation Tcst

(Afq$

Boffom

quartile

7Z?o

52To

22Vo

Second

quarfile

tT

33

26

9

14

26

3

2

25

Third
Top

quartile

quartile
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Education does influence dependency and that a majority of women collecting AFDC have
serious educational deficiencies. Due to these facts, the jobs that most recipients are employable

for are those that need persons with low-skills and low-education and that most likely do not
allow for these women to provide the most basic necessities for their children. Burtless (1997) is
Iess sympathetic than most, though, and feels that an

certainly find an employer willing to offer her

a

urukilled welfare recipient can almost

job if she is willing to work hard for low wages.

While these job opportunities do not offer outstanding prospects, Burtless (1997) feels lhat it is
important to recognize that job opportunities exist for applicants who are rvilling to accept them,
a fact confirmed

by the job-finding success of unskilled immigrants who enter the U.S. suffering

worse disadvantages than most but still managing to find and keep

jobs. Holzer (1997) however,

states that declining real wages suggests that the labor market has recently shifted to paying less

for unskilled workers. If this is true, than the opporhrnities for welfare recipients look bleak
unless the govemment is willing to pay to educate them. Holzer (L9971found that of the

recipients that spent five years or more on AFDC, 63 percent lacked a high school diploma or

GED. Rein (1982), however, did find that a significant portion of the welfare recipients

are

endowed with characteristics that indicate employment potential. fn sum, the research points out
that recipients do possess characteristics that will make them less employable, yet there are work

opportunities for them that do not require a great deal of skill.
Another skill deficiency that will limit welfare recipients ability to compete and find

jobs is work experience. Holzer (1997) stated lhat 50To of long-term recipients report no work
experience in the year prior to beginning their AFDC spells, and most reported no work
experience in the past five years. Despite these deficiencies, there is evidence which suggests
that many recipients are employable, for instance, between January

of 1994 and JanuarT of t997

there was a shaqp drop in the number of welfare caseloads with almost one million recipients

disappearing from the rolls (McMurrer, Sawhill,

& Lerman, 1997). What isn't clear

is exactly

why these recipients left the welfare rolls. McMurrer et al. (1997) believes that the experience of
the past few years suggests that nrhen pulled by a sEong economy and pushed by new welfare

10

rules, at least some of the unskilled can find work. McMurrer et al. (1gg7) however did point
out
that those who remain on welfare are going to be a d,isadvantaged group due
to lack of skills,

similar to Holzer's (1997) findings. The fact remains that most, if not all, researchers
believe that

inevitably a group of those on werfare will he unable to find work.
Some authors believe that the solution to employing welfare recipients lies
within the

welfare prograrns themselves, while others feel that it is a more individualized issue.
Harris
(1993) views employabitity through the human capital model
which theoretically describes the
process of recipients hecoming employed based on their investments
in human capital, such as
education, job skills, and work experience. Ha:ris (1993) also emphasizes that
the more human

capital a person has, the more employable they are. In contrast, Crueron (1995)
cites that it is the

mix of services provided by a program that determines an individuals' success. In
the JOBS
program a mixed strategy of education, haining, and job search varied
the degree to which they
emphasized an immediate push to employment or further investment in human
capital (Gueron,

1995). Another important point made by Greron (1995) is that the implementation of programs
must be done properly- For instance, in the GAIN progr3m no clear link
rvas found between

educational uaining and academic skills improvement, leaving little room to justify (Gueron,
it

1995)- Gueron's L995 findings indicate, however, that the educational taining program
did
better than work-focused, job-search-only programs, giving some justification,
Although Gueron

(1995) found that educational training progrimu faired better
than work-focused prograrns, Casse
(19971, Mead (1996), as well as Nightingale and Holcomb (1gg7)
found the opposite.

Recently, Manpower Demonshations Research Center (MDRC) released preliminary
results from an evaluation conducted of JOBS which looked encouraging. Two
different
versions of jobs were tested, a "labor force attachment" framework which stesses job
search and

immediate work, and a "human capital development" approach which encourages
education and

taining-

The labor force attachment results are much stronger, in part because impacts
are

delayed with education and raining, but also because work programs are more successful
in
placing Iargernumbers of people in jobs quicker (Mead, 1996). In agreement
with Mead (19g6),
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Casse (1997) concedes that for welfare recipients with minimal job experience, any work

experience at all often proves to be far more effective at moving recipients into jobs than months

of haining or classroom education.
Nightingale and Holcomb (1997) also found that progriilns rvith activities directly
related to employment, specifically job-search a.ssistance and work experience, increased

employment and earnings (Nightingale

& Holcornb, 1997).

So what is the best approach? Reed

(1994) agrees with Gueron (1995) that in looking at the whole picture including, program costs,

job placement outcomes, job stability, and time, a mix of services tends to fair the best. Quick-

fix approaches may display immediate benefits but have proven to not increase the employability
of recipients in the long-run. In contrast to Crueron's (1995) findings conceming educational
programs, Reed (1994) states that long-term educational programs can only service so many at a
time and are not realistically cost-effective. A mix of services based on the area and population

in a specific state seems to be the best proposed solution to producing employable welfare
recipients" Mead (1996) and

Ca,sse (1997), although they favor

job search and placement for

a

high percentage of recipients, tend to agree with the mixing of services due to the diversity of
needs of welfare recipients. A case could definitely be made by weHare researchers that welfare

reform policy-makers should concentrate more on job search and placement than education and

baining for a majority of recipients, but they also agree that there are some recipients who will
need more than a push to find

a

job.

Education and fiaining may be necessary to keep them off

the urelfare rolls.
Job Availability.
The number of persons who

will be pushed off the rolls due to time limits over the next

few years is around 2 million, but not all will enter the labor force (Holzer, 1996). The number of
people entering the lahor force in combination with a high number of them lacking skills will
have some kind of affect on job availability, but what rue some other factors? Many labor
economists believe that jobs for low skill workers will be readily available in the U.S. (Brntless,

L9971. McMurrer et al. (1997) also claimed that the unemployment rate is at its lowest level
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years, and it is hard to argue that jobs are not available. If the demand in the market continues to

grow then the labor force may be able to handle the influx of workers, but whether it will
continue to grow, is the question. Many authors feels that as a growing numher of welfare
recipients move into the labor market, job availability will decrease (Lamer et al., 1997; Burtless,
L997; Mason, 1985). Kleppner, Director of the Office for Social Policy Research at Northem

Illinois University, is conducting

a

job survey encompa.ssing six states including Minnesota, and

concludes:" the job gap may be slightly less because the unemployment rate is lower now but the
fact remains that there are not enough jobs-period" (Davis & Juarez, lgg7 , p. 17) Grunwald
{1997) agrees firith the "cycle" theory, ffid states that a low unemployment rate will be affected

by the flood of welfare recipients pushed off the rolls and crowding the labor market. The main
fear of this is that as more applicants compete for fewer jobs, working wages and the standard of

living will decline. Supply and demand pressures cannot be erased and research shows that
former welfare recipients have been the most likely to be laid off when the market is flooded
(Crnrnwald, 1997). Casse (1997) argues that public-sector jobs will need to be developed to
absorb the rush of recipients into the job market, but warns that these jobs are expensive and

difficult to manage. Although the market may look good now, after thousands of people begin
looking and taking jobs, that will change. What is not for sure known is whether it will be good
or bad change, The hope is that the lahor market will continue to grow and due to more people

working, making money, and demanding services and products from the economy it will grow to
absorb the influx of workers.
Despite popular belief, many welfare recipients want to

work. Longitudinal research

revealed that nearly half of those receiving welfare benefits also held jobs (Larner et al., 1997).
was observed that haH of those that worked, combined work and welfare while the other half

cycled back and forth between the two. In considering the new welfare reform, job availability
may be limited to temporary jobs, part-time jobs, and seasonal positions making weHare an
important supplemental income at times or necessary support for people until something more
permanent or fuIl-time comes up.

It
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Nightingale and Holcomb (lgg7) see working with the labor market as a chnllenge
because of administrators poor understanding of

it. In order for jobs

to be available people need

to be trahed in positions that have the highest needs. For example, if people
are trained to be
secretaries and there is not a market for secretaries then there

will not be jobs available for them.

Often, the success of work prograrns is based solely on the labor market
at the time. If there is a

high demand for rvorkers, programs will be more succqssful than if there is low
demand
(Nightingale

&

Holcomb

, LggT). Recent

analysis' of the current and future labor market

indicates that the nation is undergoing major structural changes in the
economy and jobs for
persons with little education and skills

a.re

not good (Bgrtless, lggy).

Gueron (1995) also recognizes job market strategies for administrators
especially in
terms of

pay. Welfarerecipients who arelooking forjobs in an economy of low-paying
work

may find themselves worse off working than on weHare. The jobs
available that actually pay the

bills and leave people better-off than if they were on welfare are few and far
between (Crueron,

1995)' Kerlin (1993) also looks at the structure of job availability but

sees the issue as more than

wages, not only do most jobs offer low-wages but also few benefits and
they are less than

full-

time' If a person has children, the benefits that come from a job such as health
care may be more
important than the pay itself. Not only is there a lack of jobs that pay
decent wages but also ones
that offer necessary benefits (Kerlin, 1993). Holzer (1996) also found
that roughly a third of all
new jobs pay $6.00 per hour or less and offer limited,

if any, benefits like health insurance or

employer contributions to pensions.

Although many researchers have stated that structural factors are key in the issue job
of
availability, there

a.re some

contradictory findings that claim personal factors are the bulk of

concern' Mason et al. (19S5) say the problem is in the recipients. If recipients are not
motivated
to gain the skills in order to get the jobs that are available, then what the labor
market looks like
is of little concem- Whether it is labor market or population atffibutes, job
availability is a
concern for welfare reform. In order for people to move off the welfare rolls, jobs
must be

available and people must have or acquire the skills in order to fit thern.

T4

Other factors such as geographical imbalances, employer recruifrnent patterns, and

discrimination were also considered by Holzer (1996). He found that these factors u,ill even
lower joh availability for welfare recipients who are seeking employment. Furthermore, Holzer
(1996) stated that in most places, finding people to

fill

the lowest skilled positions will not be

difficult for employe$ and soon workers will be competing for the small percentage of these jobs
fhat are available. It appears that only time will show how job availability will play out and
researchers have obvious mixed opinions.
Costs of rfforking.

A challenge facing welfare recipients who begin to work

are the new expenses

associated with employment. Often times the costs of working outweigh the benefits of

independence. In addition to outlays for food and housing, they are faced with child catre, health
care, Eansportation costs, and time spent away from their children (Larner et al., 1997). Harris

(1993) agrees with Larner and colleagues and states that "the economic benefits of work must
outweigh the costs of child

ca^re,

medical care, role sfiain, and loss of time with children" (p.

338). How will weHare programs handle this issue? Researchers who have studied the costs and
benefits of welfare vs. work, debate what are the most significant issues surrounding this

dilemma. What is clear, however, is that some issues can be pinpointed, but what may he
significant to an individual could be the opposite of what may be significant for another

individual. What a person, especially

a single-mother, is

udlling to sacrifice is very

individualized. Mothers who receive welfare have an average of 2.6 children, two-thirds of
whom are under age six and must be supervised during the hours when their mothers are

working (Kisker & Ross, 1997). [n

a case where a mother may make $6.00 per

hour and

mustpay ffr average of $1.60 per hour, for child care this can become a significant issue. Kisker

& Ross (1997) state that child

care costs are one of the reasons why some mothers choose not to

work. With welfare reforrn and mandatory work requirements, recipients will need subsidies in
order to purchase child ca.re, or they

will be forced to find low-cost informal child care

iurangements that may not he as good or

a.s

safe

for children (Larner et al., 1997). Since most
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prograrns are planning on providing some type of child care subsidies, in the short run programs

wilt be more expensive than the current system, but tsesha.rov (1995) believes that it will be
worth it if people change their behavior and become economically self-sufficient. Lamer et al.
(1997) disagrees that it is a "behavior" issue stating that even in the long run mothers may not
have the resources in order to care for their children's basic needs because the fact is that a

majority of these women do want to work. In the next paragraph, this discussion shifts to what
the benefits are for working and why under the right conditions more people would prefer work
over welfare. Casse (L997) points out though, that there are always some recipients that will see
welfare

a.s

a way out of the world

of adult responsibility. Kerlin (1993) conducted

a study

in

which she interviewed women who choose work over welfare even though they had little
financial benefit, no health coverage, md less desirable jobs. Her findings showed that most of
the women had significantly positive things to say about their jobs despite all this. Some of the
responses included socializing with other adults, leaming new things, purpose to life, feelings of

accomplishment, and over all having

fun. ln terms of internal feelings, it was shown that these

women truly want to be employed but the extemal reasons brought about barriers to their

employment. Included in their external barriers to working were child sare, illness', health care,
and tansportation (Kerlin, 1993). Is it possible for mandatory work programs to override these

extemal barriers and convince women to rvork despite them?
Larner et al. (1997) states that a push to work could have devastating results. Economic
pressures on isolated poor may force families to move out of homes, cut food budgets, and leave

young children home alone or with unreliable supervision. Larner et al. (1997) also states that
increased child neglect and rates of foster care placement could

ocfllr especially with the new

time limits on welfare dependency. Such undesirable consequences could be mitigated by
assuring the availability of in-kind assistance such as housing and child care subsidies.
The tme concem in regards to welfare reform and mandatory work programs is the affect

that it will have on children (Zoslow

& Emig, t997; Oliker,

1995; Moore

& Driscoll, 1997). To

avoid instituting policies that harm children most authors seem to agree that policymakers must
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consider what is known about how children will fare when their mothers move from welfare to

work. It is known that a significant relationship is found between the income level of AFDC
families and the outcomes of children. Research shows that children from low-income families
are more likely to be abused, neglected, and end up in an equally dependent situation that their
parents did (Mason et al., 1985). There is debate, however, regarding how maternal employment
and the new mandatory work requirements

will affect children and if work will be worth the time

they are forced to spend away from their children.
Oliker (1995) states that the henefits and costs of working are not stable calculations in
terms of time spent away frorn children. The failure of low-wage jobs to make time away from

children worth it heavily depends on each individual situation. If a child is chronicatly ill, a
newbom, or has emotional problems and if the neighborhood, daycare, school, etc. are not safe
havens for children, it rnay affect a mothers' decision more significantly (Oliker, 1995). Often

women on welfare, like many other mothers in America, are willing to forego economic
advantage and allocate time from work effort to care for their children themselves,

if they have

concems about the care of their children. It is often hard for mothers to trust others with the lives

of their children.
When studying the outcomes for children, in terms of how they are affected by matemal
employment many factors need to be considered in order for the findings to be valid. Lamer et.

al (1997) stated that there is little reliable knowledge about this topic because the new welfare law

will force a broader cross section of poor single mothers into the labor force, with more variable
outcomes. The research that has been conducted suggests that children whose mothers work but
earn little are likely to experience both positive and negative effects and that as the mother's

income increases so does the more positive outcomes for their children. Moore

& Driscoll

(1997) found that behavior problems diminish with children as matemal wages increase.

Although there is some room for interpretation, in terms of a mothers' slanted report, these
findings also suggested that in low-income families, matemal employment does not, on flverage,
harrn children. Even though it does not appear to harm children, Moore

& Driscoll (1997)

t7
hesitate to state that there is necessarily a concrete positive outcome. They do state that their
results suggest a picture of no effects or of positive implications, with the exception of lower

math scores for boys when mothers work at low-wages (Moore

& Driscoll, 1997). Zaslow &

Emig (1997) found with increasing certainty that maternal employment itself, and not other
factors as Moore

& Driscoll (1997) stated, confributes to improved child

outcomes in low-income

families. They did state, however, that conditions such a.s low-wages, poor working conditions,
and work that is in the first year of a child's life may undermine the generally positive effects of

matemal employment on children (Zaslow

& Emig,

L997).

When determining sanctions and grant reductions for persors ofl welfare the child's
weHare should be an important concern. Welfare to work programs in the past have intended to

resolve the tension between helping children yet demanding parental responsibility (Blank

&

Blum, 1997), fome innovative welfare agencies have taken on the challenge and have
successfully been able to promote employment 'while supporting children's needs, but these
programs are in the minority. Unfortunately, children often get lost in society's belief that those
who don't work shouldn't receive benefits, but it is clear that children do not make taking away
benefits that clear cut of an answer.
Job Stability.

Achieving economic self-sufficiency requires sustained employment, hut studies show
that from half to two-thirds of the welfare recipients who leave weHare for work lose their job

within a yea"r (Lamer et al., 1997). However, many retum to work and begin a cycle of job starts
and losses. This pattem is represented in Table 2 anthe next page, which shows the employment
patterns of single-mother recipients in Portland, Oregon, who utere followed for a minimum

of

six months and found that of the 6LTo of those that lost their first job, 78To found a second joh,
and so

on (Hershey & Pavetti , 1997).

The fertility rates of women can be considered indicators

for job stability. It is decreasing for women in industialized countries because they are choosing

work oyer having children (Johnston & Packard, 1994). Millions of women in the U"S. are
striving for job stability which could have a positive impact on their ability to remain off welfare.
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Table 2
Successive

lob SilE

d

Lffises in ihe Pordmd, OEeg@, JOBS

Eryhymeff

Retentfum

Iniliqtive

119 AFDC recipients frnd first job

72 of tLg

(6L%l

56 of 72

lose first job

tttfrl,

32 of 56

find second job

(s7fril

22 of 32

lose second job

(69%) find ttrird job

10

of 22 (45%l lose third job

Note: Because these work status changes occurred during

a period

of 6 to 12 months, reflecting

the staggered entry of participation into the progritm, the extent of cycling in and out of jobs may
be underestimated. Moreover, all in the sample were participating in an intensive

postemployment program that probably held down rates of job loss.

The reasons behind job instability are numerous and why people can't stay employed after

leaving the weHare rolls is debatable. Continuing program experience and research have brought
to the attention of policymakers the importance of helping welfare recipients stay employed not

just find a job. T.he follorving paragraphs review what is known about job stability and the
challenges faced by

it.

Some of the reasons adfuessed include the nature of the job, the personal

skills they hrins to jobs, the pressures and disruptions they face from their personal lives, and the
framework past and current policy provides that is limited in its support of joh stability,

A

1995

study by the Institute for Women's Policy Research found that, during a two-year period, 43Vo of.
a sample of women on welfare did work at some time in that period (Hershey

& Pavefii, 1997).

Rein (1982) also found that only 25 percent of female heads were never employed. The fact is
that many women on weHare do work and are willing to work but either the jobs they

find are

short lasting placing them back on welfare or they must combine work and welfare in order to
make ends meet.

I9
The reasons behind frequent job changes are numerous, according to Kerlin (1993),

family needs, illness, frustration with wages, personal conflicts with supervisors, hours being cut,
and the discovery in some cases that working made one poorer than being on welfare. In Table 3

on this page, it is shown joh-related and personal-related reasons as to why job loss occured with

former welfare recipients, job-related reasons were cited more than personal reasons (Hershey &
Pavetti, L997\.
Table 3

Reams Given fmroh l-oss by Fmer Ylbffue nffiUEnE

JohRdmed Reasms

Pensmal Reasm.s

39To laid

tSVo health problem

off or fired

67o wages too

low

4Yo didn't like the

job

LIVI child care problem
9To pregnancy

3To changed jobs

5To

SVo other

SVo other

tamily problems

Kerlin (1993) looks at the welfare system from the point of view of behavior theory, and what

is

known in regards to positive and negative reinforcement, and found that it seems as though the
system fails to reward those who do work, instead it punishes them by taking away benefits and

supports when they begin to work (Kerlin, 1995). This lack of reinforcement, leaves recipients

with incentives to move back on welfare. Gueron (lgg5) agrees but believes ttrat these hard to
employ

ca.$es are

only a small percentage, and that although they will pose a challenge to

administrators, with the right amount of supports and subsidies they can becorne long term
employable people. More resources and committments to working with recipients must be

provided in order to support participants (Gueron, lgg5).
What kind of weHare recipient is unable to secure employment after two years of welfare

support? According to Gilbert (1994), it is likely to include the Ieast skilled and least motivated
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in the welfare population and the social and economic cost of employing them in public works

will be staggering. Due to this belief, Gilbert (1994) suggests that these women be treated
separately than those who use welfare as a temporary means. Hershey

& Pavefti (1997) disagree,

stating that it really is a mix of reasons why recipients can't stabilize employment, not the

personal characteristics of welfare recipients and that joh-related and personal sitgation factors
need to be reviewed in order to see the real reasons behind recipients not heing able to sustain

employment. Often it is difficult for women to find successful employment opportunities
because poor women face great uncertainty and complexity in their lives along with little choices
(Hershey

& Pavetti,1997). In a study conducted in New Jersey,

S7%oof mothers who left or lost

their job said the main rea.son was job-related, the remaining cited personal reasons such as

pregnancy, health problems, or family issues. Although it is an unpopular thought, most people
are unable to maintain job stability for reasons other than laziness (Hershey

&

Pavetti

, 19971.

Another factor affecting job stability appears to be the types of jobs that welfare
recipients are obtaining. Harris (1993) states that job recidivism has been high in the past due to
the placement of recipients in low-wage jobs that do not improve job skills or sufficiently support

families. Moving from welfare to self-sufficiency through work, then, shou-ld be highly
dependent on recipients'resources and ahilities to find stable employment.

If

the jobs obtained

do not funher promote job success and stability then efforts are lost (Harris, 1993). Lane (1994)
di.scusses

job stability more in terms of the type of jobs that women are employed at and how the

characteristics of these jobs produce unsteady job placement. Several studies have documented

that women face an irregular, part-time, part-yeff work pattern that only offer low hourly wages,

no fringe benefits, and no job security (Rein, 1982). Most women are employed in retail and
manufacturing which show a much higher recidivism rate than professional and goveilrment jobs
that are mainly held by men (Lane, 1994). When female recipients look at prospective futgre
eamings, they most likely will find that jobs that have better eaming potential are not the usual
fields that women becorne employed

in.

Hershey

& Pavetti (1997)

agree and state that jobs

obtained by female recipients seldom lead to hrgher rnages, and often offer few benefits.
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"Almost regardless of the state of the economy, the most disadvantaged are likely to
encounter real difficulties in securing steady employment" (McMurer et al., p. 11, 1997).

Grunwald (1997) agrees and states that the problem for recipients is not just getting
is hard enough, it's keeping

a

a

job, which

job especially for some. Turnover rates are quite high for welfare

recipients and Holzer (1996) found that this was mostly due to involuntary separations rather
than quits. These three researchers all give indication that lack of job stability is less fikely the
weHare recipients' fault than most would like to believe. Furthermore, Holzer (1996) stated that
these difficulties in keeping employment drove most recipients back into the welfare
and Blum (1997) emphasize that subsidies and supplementing recipients income

rolls. Blank

will be key in

stabilizing their employment. If recipients are better off working than not working they are more

Iikely to remain at work. These factors may be related to Rein's (1982) findings that many
encounters that recipients have with work are short lived.
Gaps in the Literatuqe.

This study, will analyze how the new welfare reform in Minnesota will fare in terms of
employrnent and economic prospects. What is different from past reform is that persons on
welfare will face the stictest work requirement yet only allowing temporary (a five year limit)
assistance to

families. At least 75To of adult recipients eventually will be required to ohtain a job

or face loss of benefits. AFDC

a.s

we know it is gone, and for the first time in 60 yeani ongoing

cash payments to families is a thing of the past. Because this is the first time in the history of

welfare that a policy such as this ha-s been implemented, research is exEemely limited conceming
the exact effects. The studies that have heen conducted, therefore, cannot not be entirely

conclusive, but they can offer some insight as to what may occur. Due to this, a majority of the
gaps in this review are based on the fact that this reform is the only of its kind making

it

impossible to study in the past. Another major gap in the research is what affects the time limits

will have. Since there never has been a time-limited policy, what type of implication will this
have on the job economy?, joh-seekers?, job stability? etc. Most importantly what kind of effect

uiill this have on families? What will happen to the children in terms of costs and benefits?
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Another gap in the literature is the effects of rewards and incentives that will now be
offered through the new reform. Will these incentives ruork? We do know through past
literature, that not having incentives perpetuates rpelfare dependency but do we know for sure
that providirrs them will help move people off welfare for good?

It is believed that this reform will change the general attitude of welfare recipients and
prosper a new era of work ethic. The research shows that a majority of people want to work but

with mandatory requirements will people feel the same about that? Will work be more of a
punishment than a benefit when people are not given a choice? Will people adhere to the new
requirements or meet them head on, refusing to comply?

How is the economy and job market going to handle this influx of workers? This will be
one of the largest movements into the labor force that we

know. Is the economy ready? Are the

jobs available at family-supporting wages now, and are they still going to be there when there is
more job demand than employee demand?

Another gap that needs to he discussed is that there has never been a head-to-head test of
mandatory versus voluntary programs (Riccio

& Hasenfeld, 1996). The studies that came close

to this never truly demonstrated that mandatory features of the program necessarily contributed to
positive effects. Does a policy emphasizing and following through with mandatory sanctions

convincingly have a positive affect on welfare recipients? There are a lot of unansrvered
questions that can only he answered after this policy has been in effect for a period of time.
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Chapter

[II

Summary of the Minnesota Family Investment Program - Statewide Policy:
Employment and Training Component
(Information provided by Welfare Reform Act Summary, May 5, 1997)
The policy under analysis is the Minnesota Family Investment Program Stateuride (MFIP-S), specifically the employment and training component. For the
purposes of this paper, the researcher has narrowed the analysis to only include aspects

of the policy relating to single-mothers who are United States citizens, not pregnant, and
over the age of 20 years

old. In this chapter,

the policy and the aspects just mentioned

will be summarized, A copied version of the official policy is in the Appendix. This
summary includes: county duties; assessments; post-secondary education; participant
requirements, rights, and expectations; exemptions; good cause for failure to comply;
sanctions; and applicable information.

County Duties
IVIFIP-S requires that all counties, by January 1, 1998, develop and provide an

employment and training services component that is designed to put participanls on the
most direct path to unsuhsidized employment. It also allows for services to be provided

to participants who are exempt but volunteer to participate. Single parent families
participation must he required by the counties within six months of receiving assistance.
The policy requires that each county, or group of counties working cooperatively, to give
a participant a choice

of at Ieast two employment and training senrice providers. Exempt

from this are counties that can document that participants have a choice or a county that
explains that having choice in service providers would be a financial hardship for the

county. Employment and fiaining service providers must have a job counselor during
the first meeting with a participant and must ensure that an overview of employment and

training services is provided. Topics are specilied that must be covered in this
orientation.
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Assessments

An assessment must be completed on all MFIP-S participants who are not exempt
as well as those volunteering to participate in employment and training services. In the

initial assessment the job counselor must aesess the participants ability to obtain and
retain employment, ba-sed on their education level, prior employment or work
experience, Eansferable work skills and existing job rnarkets. The job counselor also has

to determine if the participant needs refresher courses for professional certification or
licenser, and to include refresher courses in the job search support plan. Mirrnesota
requests 40 hours per week of work activities, hut the Federal policy allows leniency to

this mandate only requiring 20 hours per week for single-mothers.
a.ssessment, the

If after the initial

job counselor determines that the participant is likely to obtain suitable

employrnent, the participant must conduct

a

job search for up to eight weeks. If after the

eight week period the participant has not found employment than a second assessment
must be conducted. During the search period the job counselor can request a review

of

the participant's progress.

A secondary assessment is required for participants who: (1) in the job
counselor's judgment, have barriers to employment that

a

job search support plan will not

overcome; (2) have completed eight weeks of job search without obtaining suitable
employment; or (3; have not received a secondary assessment, provided the panicipant is

working at least 20 hours per week and the participant, job counselor, or county agency
requests an assessment. The job counselor is required to use the results of the secondary
assessment to develop an employment

plan. As part of the employment plan, the

provider must inform participants about other vendors or resources that can also provide
employment and training services. The employment plan also includes specific activities
that are tied to a goal and are designed to move the participant along the most direct path

to unsubsidized employment. Specific steps must be listed as well as a timetable for each
step. Employment plans can be revised if

a

job is lost or quit with good cause.
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Secondarv-Educ ation

Under MFIP-S participants are limited to only 12 or less months of postsecondary education or

taining. A program lasting up to 24 months can be approved if

there is documentation supponing the need for the program and the participant maintains

satisfactory progress in the program. It also provides that a program lasting between 13

md 24 months can only be approved if the participant

agrees to repay the amount

of

employment and training funds paid to by the county to support the second year of

education. The loan is interest free and is in repayment status when the participant (1)
completes the program and obtains suitable employment at lSOTo or more of the poverty

level; or (2) Ieaves the program before completion and obtains suitahle employment at

t\frVo or more of the poverty level" A participant cannot be approved for more than a
total of 24 months of post-secondary education or training. Ttre participant has three
months to complete their job search following completion of education then they must
accept any suitahle employment.

Panicipant Requirempnts. Ri8hts. and Expectations
Ttre panicipants are required to comply with the terms of their employment plan.

They are also required to accept any suitable employment once the steps in the
employment plan are completed. Failure of a participant to comply with an employment
plan, or guitting suitable employment without good cause, will result in the imposition of
a sanction. The participant is required to inform the

job counselor within three working

days any changes that are related to their employment status. The participant is

allowd

to use an employment plan developed in other programs with job counselor approval,
provided the plan meets or is modified to meet MFIP-S requirements.
Exemptions
MFIP-S allows certain persons to be exempt from the employment and training

requirements. Those include:

1.

A person age 60 or older.
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2-

A person rvho is prevented, by a certified permanent or temporary illness, injury

or incapacity that is e4pected to continue for more than 30 days, from obtaining or
retaining employment.

3-

A person required in the home to care for a household member professionally

certified to be

4-

ill or incapacitated.

A caregiver for a child under one year of age who personally provides fulI-time

care for the child (only claimed

5-

for 12 months in a lifetime).

A person who is employed at least 40 hours per week, or 30 hours per week with

10 additional hours of job search.

6-

A person experiencing a personal or family crisis who is incapable of program

participation.
MFIP-S does require that a caregiver who is considerd exempt because they are

caring for a child under 12 weeks to attend an early childhood and famity education
class, a parenting class, or some similar activity,

if available, during the exemption

period.
Good Cause for Failure to Comply
Under MFIP-S a participant may claim good cause for failing to comply with
requirements of the orientation or the employment and training component when one of
the follouring conditions exist:

1.

The appropriate child care is not available.

2.

The

3.

The participant is

4-

The participant must care for an

job does not meet the definition of suitable employment.

ill or injured
ill or disabled family member and the care

prevents the participant from complying with the panicipant' plan,

5.

The necessary tansportation is not available.

6-

An emergency arises that prevents compliance with the participant's plan.

7.

Compliance with the participant's plan conflicts with judicial proceedings.
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8-

The participant is already participating in acceptable work activities.

9.

The activities in the participant's plan are not availahle.

10.

Suitable employment is not available.

11-

The participant documents other impediments to compliance that are beyond the

participant's control.

It is required that the procedures for a sanction must be followed when

a

nonexempt participant fails, without good cause, to comply with employment and

training seryices requirennents.
Sanctions

If a participant is going to be sanctioned it is required that they receive notice of
this. A participant can request

a conciliation conference that requires the

job counselor's

supervisor or a designee to review the outcome of the conference. If the conciliation
conference resolves the noncompliance, then the county will be informed and the
sanction withdrawn. A participant can request a fair hearing instead of a conciliation

conference. H a participant requests either a conciliation conference or a fair hearing
sanctions will not be imposed r"rntil there is a determination of noncompliance.

If it is determined that a participant is non compliant and no conc,iliation
conference or fair hearing is requested, a sanction is effective 10 days after the required
notice is given. Each month a participant fails to comply with a requirement is
considered a separate occrurence of noncompliance.
For the first occurrence of noncompliance, a participant's grant is reduced 10

percent of the applicable transitional standard. The sanction is then in effect for at least
one month. The sanction is only removed when the participant is in compliance. For a
second or subsequent occurrence, a participant's rent, and at county option, utilities are

vendor paid up to the amount of the participant's grant. The residual amount of the grant
that is left after vendor paying rent and utilities is reduced by 30 percent of the applicable
trans

itional standard.
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Applicable Information
Working families will receive an income supplement as they increase their
earnings, not leaving public assistance until their income is AOVI above the 1996 poverty

level. All families on ruelfare will recieve health care and those that work will recieve
child ca.re. Families that are just making the Eansition from welfare to work will receive
child care subsidies determined by income on a sliding fee scale, even if they are not on
cash assistance. These families

will also be ahle to buy health insurance by payirrg

a

premium based on their income. In determinirrg grant amount, MFIP-S allows a 36
perccnt eamings disregard that is calculated with the family wage level based on a
transitional standard.

If

a person is the

victim of domestic violence or continuing to be at

risk of domestic violence and has developed a safety plan, then they are defered from
panicrpation requirements and expectations for up to one year.

A 60 month lifetime limit on MFIP-S begins July 1, 1997. Most nerrcomers to
Minnesota will not receive benefits for the first 30 days in the state, as they establish

residency. Newcomers to Minnesota will have the time they received benefits in another
state applied to the 60 rnonth

limit or, if they have reached their limit in another state,

they will receive no aid. Because child support payment is often how many single-parent

families avoid weHare, aggressive child support efforts will be a pafi of MFIP-S.
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Chapter

[V: Methodology: Policy Analysis

Methodology is a way to find out about a subject or issue through a process of inquiry.
The methodology applied here is policy analysis and is used for the purposes of inquiring further
into the subject of welfare reform in Miruresota. The policy analysis utilized is a modified
rational problem-solving approach within a strengths perspective. This policy analysis will
include a definition of the prohlem, discussion of the policy's goals and objectives, the

underlying assumptions and values, an analysis/critique that includes discussion of strengths and
limitations of the policy, and identification of altemative employment promotion strategies.
Problem Definition
Many people have varied opinions regarding the problems of the welfare system and

why people are dependent on

it.

The main question raised is: what needs to be done in order to

improve the system? A solution has been proposed by the Federal government which is
currently being implemented across the cor-rntry. In Minnesota it is called MFIP-S. The research
question posed is: Will the employment and naining component of MFIP-S effectively meet its
int€nded goals of welfare reform for single-mothers? This question was established based on the
problems that are helieved to be associated with participants of the welfare system including
poverty, dependency, and weak labor force attachment. This problem will be defined in the

folloudng paragraphs, paying attention to these three main aspects. Although these aspects are
discussed separately, it is important to note their interrelatedness. Federal welfare reform, as well
as, MIIIP-S are policies striving to address these issues of weak lahor force attachment,

dependency, and poverty and reach the intended goals of increasing work effort, which the hope
is will in fact, increase income lifting participants out of poverty and decreasing their dependency
on welfare.
Povertv
Nearly one-quarter of American families become poor at some time in a given decade
(Mead, 1994). The fact that most people at some time in their life need to depend on govemment
dollars is an issue that will always exist and few have problems with

it.

Many people, for many
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explainable reasons, live in poverty for short periods of time, assisting these families with getting
back on their feet is not a policy or societal concem. Long-term poverty, however, is of poticy

concem. Based on the 1995 poverty level, approximately 38 million people were living in
poverty in that year with over a fifth being children (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1997). The singlemother family household is at the highest risk for becoming poor and staying poor for long
periods of time (Mead, 1994). Many researchers have different opinions concerning the most

influential reiLson for why this

is.

Mead (1994) for:nd that the combination of female-

headedness coupled with nonwork or low wages are the most influential indicators of long-term

poverty. Abramovitz (1996)

sees the

problem a^s the nfeminization of poverty" describing a

gender division of labor and female oppression in a patriarchal society. Haffis (1993) showed
the relationship between divorce and nonmarital childbearing with an increase in the number of

women living in

poverty. ln looking

at current welfare reform, it is apparent that Mead's

interpretation of the relationship between women, work, and poverty has some significant
influence, but all explanations are important and considered in this analysis of poverty.

In Minnesota, officials are ooncemed with child poverty. The incomes of families with
children were declining in the state, as they were across the country previous to welfare reform.
This came primarily from a decline in real wages for low-wage workers combined with increases

in single parenthood (Miller et aI., LggT). Because children constitute almost two-thirds of the
welfare population, there is concem that the most basic aspects of their life may be altered

as

welfare policy changes are enforced.
Female-headedness.
Female-headedness consists of a family (mother and children) in which the female is
the only parent present and the main financial contributor. Female-headedness seems to include
several pattems that evidence shows tend to produce families living in poverfy (Mead, 1994).
The fact that women are a large percentage of welfare recipients is no coincidence, and there
have been many studies conducted on what causes their poverfy. Mctanahan

(1989) found that divorce and single-motherhood are seen

as

& Garfinkel

problematic in terms of their high
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rate of poverty and lower rate of socioeconomic attainment among their children. It is clear that
there is a correlation between poverty and female-headedness, but does female-headedness

actually cause poverty? This is a highly debated issue of which many opinions have emerged.
Women who have children out of wedlock are consciously placing themselves and their

children at a higher risk for living dependent on vvelfare, but Mead (1994) points out that the lack
of responsibility on the fathers' part is often forgotten. Women are most likely left with the child
or children to care for and many times there is not support from the father(s) (Harris, 1993).
Poverfy may then be considered a result of female-headedness when there is a lack of support

from the noncustodial parent. One explanation for the hlame toward welfare mothers is that they
serve as proxies for unsupportive or unemployed men (Mclanahan

In the

ca.se

& Garfinkel,

1989).

of divorce, the story often goes that the mother is left caring for the children

on a full-time basis. The reason this is problematic is due to the fact that parental breakup
undoubtedly reduces

a

family's potential earnings because the father then fypicatly contributes

less money after the split than he did before (Mead, 1994). The loss of eamings in a family unit
as a whole is the largest single reason why a family moves into poverty, and a rise in eamings

after marriage or partnership is the largest reason why families escape poverty (Harris, 1993).
The fact remains that when a father is present, families are less likely to be poor than when they
are absent. In general, though, a single-parent (which in most cases is a woman) is at a higher

risk for poverty because of the decrease in household income, proving that divorce and unwed
childbearing are causes of poverty (Larner et al., t997).
Females are also at a disadvantage when they are the main source of income in a

family, due to the fact that women in general make less than men (Lane, 1994). Women overall
work in lower paying job sectors and many researchers recognize this as part of our patriarchal
society (Harris, 1993; Abramovitz, 1996). Until women begin making the wages men do, they
are at an unfair advantage. This fact coupled with the cost and responsibility of caring

for

children fulI-time places u/omen's chances at hecoming or remaining poor at an increased

probability.
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Although the emphasis of this analysis is on single-mothers, it is important to note that
other populations account for a high percentage of the poverty class. Not only does gender

influence

a person's chance

of living in poverty, but also a person's rase, age, health, disability,

and family history does. People of color are at a higher risk for poverty due to unequal wage

distributions and prejudices a,mongst employers (Holzer, 1996). The elderly also make up a high
percentage of the poor, but children account for two-thirds of those who live in poverty (Lamer
et al., 1997). A person with a disability is twenty times more likely to live in poverty than a

nondisabled person (Oliker, 1995).

ff aperson

is born into poverty her chances of perpetuating

that cycle is likely (Mead, 1994). Although it is apparent that single mothers make-up a large

portion of those living in poverty these other groups that were just mentioned should not be
excluded.

Nonwork and Low Wages.
Nonwork is defined as when a person does not work outside the home in legitimate

work. Low wages is defined

as when a person works

for wages that don't allow her to live above

poverty level. The immediate reason for most adult poverty is lack of eamings (Mead, 1994).
Nonwork is viewed by many as the problem with poverty. Haris (1993) in agreement found that
poverty in America has historically been viewed as a problem of work effort. Those who live in
poverty either cannot work, choose not to work, or do not work enough (Haris, 1993). The
poverty population is considered at an exffeme disadvantage in terms of finding and continuing
to work due to discrimination, lack of education, work skills, and work experience (Mead, L994).
These re&sons form bariers to employment along with family responsihilities, health, disability,
and inability to access necessary supports in order to engage in work outside the home.

A

common belief has formed that most poor people are simply unemployable for a range of
personal reasons and being unemployable leafu to their position of living in poverty (Mead,
1994),
There is also the belief that most able-bodied people dependent on welfare choose not

to work. The reasons associated with a person choosing not to work could have to do with
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disincentives to working such as making less, lack of benefits, or lost time with children (Harris,

1993). Another reason may be lack of motivation and responsibitity. Research has shown that
overall people want to work and are wiiling to under the right circumstances (Larner et, al.,

1997). High tumover in low-paying, low-skill jobs also has become an explanation of poverty
(Mead, 1994). White, well-educated workers often obtain jobs that are more desirable and befier

paying, while those in poverty are employed in jobs that are less desirable, Iower paying and
provide few or no henefits. What is important to note, however, is that just because a person
works does not necessarily mean that they do not live in poverty. Handler
stated that single-parents whether working or not have a high risk of

even among families with two wage earners, a fifth remain

& Haserrfeld (1997)

living in poverty, and that

poor. Being employed, even full-

time, doesn't necessarily constitute freedom of poverty.
The last issue to be discussed that is associated with nonwork and poverty is that
persons do not work enough. A high percentage of available jobs do consist of temporary,
seasonal, or part-time positions which lead to issues for many people (Holzer, 1996). This lack

of full-time employment often leaves them still under the poverty line. Even those who work
full-time, may not be able to eam enough to move out of poverfy and off the welfare rolls, this
fact shows that the low wage labor market isn't always sufficient and needs to be considered.

Nonwork is a key issue in the definition of the problem. It is discussed here briefly in terms of its
obvious influence on poverty. Nonwork will be mentioned in greater detail later in this chapter
when weak labor force attachment is discussed.
Dependency
"Public opinion polls indicate that many Americans think the welfare system traps
families in poverty and dependency, harming the very children it is designed to help' (Larner et

al, 1997, p" 4). Dependency for the purposes of this analysis is defined as when a peffion
depends on puhlic assistance at any level in order to meet basic human needs. Public assistance
has been available for over 60 years and many have found themselves having long-term

dependency on the system. Many states have designed welfare demonsfiation projects that
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emphasize independence and economic self-sufficiency. The idea of decreasing dependency has

obviously been in the minds of people before the recent welfare reform. The problem of
dependency wtus defined when the cost of providing assistance to families was causing sfrains in
state budgets, forcing them to lower

eligibilify and cut off benefits when the families income rose

(Larner et al., 1997). Unfortunately, this left many families in a dilemma. They made barely
enough to survive on working, and had no child care or health care benefits, eventually they

would end up back on assistance, leaming that it did not pay to work. This pattern influenced
increase dependency on welfare. As this pattern became more evident and increasingly
burdensome, states began to produce programs to encourage and support work.

As a person's dependency becomes long-term they begin to detach from the labor force
and become socially isolated which increases their likelihood to continue dependency

(Mclanahan & Garfinket, 1989). Mother-only families are of particular concem in terms of
weak labor force attachment, dependence, and poverty because they tend to experience longer
periods of these phenomenon than other poor groups (Mclanahan

& Garfinkel,

1989).

Dependency is also related to social isolation which is another major issue of welfare

dependency. When persons become dependent on welfare they also become increasingly
isolated, not only from the working world but also the general pubtic (Mead, 1994'). As people
on weHare are identified, they are placed into low-income housing buildings and a neighborhood

of dependency is formed. These persons, and all of the persons around them, are isolated from
the rest of society increasing their risk at becoming economically dependent and living in poverty

on a long-term basis.
Weak Labor Force Attachment
Weak lahor force attachment has proven to be the highest indicator of families living in

poverty (Sawhill, 1995). It is defined as when a person has not worked in a private sector job for
two years or more. Weak attachment is viewed

as

problematic for several reasons. First, it

clearly has cost for the individual, given that wages is the primary source of income for all

nonelderly adults (Mclanahan & Garfinkel 1989). Those who are not attached to the labor force,
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therefore, are most likely very poor, homeless, living in poverty, or eaming money illegally.
Weak labor force afiachment also has costs for the rest of society, when citizens ultimately pay

for recipient's high levels of public assistance (Mclanahan & Garfinkel, 1989). The weak labor
force attachment of people in this country has an obvious affect on all of us.
Weak Iabor force attachment also affects a person's ability to lift herself out of poverty.
The problem is that employers often see a lack of an employment history and dependency as a

signal that the individual is not as motivated or dedicated as a person who has a normal work

history (Jacohsen & Levin, 1995). Therefore, not only does weak labor force attachment have a
direct correlation with poverty but it also is a major barrier for persons attempting to move out of
poverty.
Persistent weak labor force attachment also occurs across generations, which is another

indicator of increased poverty. Mclanahan and Garfinkel (1989) argue that persistence across
generations is a necessary condition for establishing the existence of a poverty class. This
persistence leaves future generations of families in poverty at an exueme disadvantage. The
issue here is more than lack of motivation or lack of job skills, it is a cycle of weak labor force
attachment and extreme dependency, and it is a cycle that can prove to
cases

be difficult to break in

of single-mother households,
ln conclusion, the definition of the problem is multifaceted. It includes the issues

surounding poverty, dependency and weak labor force attachment. Addressing this problem is
not easy, and solutions are not certain. The attempts by past reforms to resolve the problems
discussed in the previous paragraphs have heen futile, at best, and these prohlem have not
disappeared but have become more prevalent. lUhether the presently enforced welfare reform

will be effective is a subject that most, if not all persons

are highly curious about.

Goals and Ohjectives
The goals and objectives for welfare reform are plentiful. President

Bill Clinton spoke

concerning the issue of welfare reform on May 26, L997. His speech identified the general goals

of his welfare to work policy and he stated, "The goals of welfare reforrn are to move millions of
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people from welfare to work, to help people to move from a lifetime of dependence to one of
independence, to move from burdening their children with a legacy of despair to leaving their

children with an inheritance of hope" (Kombluh, 1996, p. 25). The Federal government has
many goals of welfare reform but has given power to Minnesota to take it's own approach as Iong
a.s

congruence is proved with Federal mandates. Minnesota's goals of welfare reform will be

discussed in the following paragraphs and they are: (1) to create a fair social contract between

families, the Federal govemment, and the state government that will promote recipients to
hecorne self-sufficient, and reduce Federal and state funding for public assistance, (2) to reward
and promote work, improving the incomes of families so that they can live independent

of

welfare, (3) to support families in their economic goals and reduce poverty and (a) to simplify
existing weHare procedures making them more accessible and efficient. Also included in this
section are the objectives of the specific policy MFIP-S and it's employment and Eaining
component which consists of: increasing recipient participation in work programs, strengthening
implementation, and attaching participants to the labor market. What is important to note is that
these are welfare system policy goals and not necessarily client goals. The two may often

conflict which is imponant to note. For the purposes of this paper, only system goals will be
addressed as they pertain to the policy under analysis.
The Social Contact

Under the new welfare reform, families will need to sign a contract with the government

in order to receive benefits. By signing this conftact, participants agree to work at becoming selfsufficient during which the government agrees to give them necessary support. (Reckers et al.,
1997). Under MFIP-S, single-parents must develop a plan by the time they have been on
assistance for six months, while two parent families and unmaffied parents underthe age

of

18

must develop a plan immediately. By having recipients develop this plan, the goal is that they

will be pressured and motivated into becoming self-sufficient (Reckers et a1., 1997). The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

of

1996 attempts to do exactly

what its title infers; have people take personal responsibility for their lives by engaging in
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programs that provide opponunities for them to begin working. The conftact is meant to be fair
and reasonahle and set expectations in exchange for benefits. These expectations not only seek

to improve the lives of participants, but lower dependency on government dollars.

In the state of Minnesota alone close to 270 million Federal dollars are spent annually
on welfare and public assistance (Reckers et al., 1997). This is a large amount of money and part

of the government's contract with families is to maintain, if not reduce, this amount. In between
families and the Federal govemment is the state. The state also has its own contract with the
Federal government rvhich entails money in the form of block grants. The state is given

flexibiliff in dealing with

its recipients, but at the same time it must abide hy some basic

requirements set out by the Federal government. One of those requirements is that the states
must move persons off welfare or they

will lose funding (Larner et al., L997).

In dollar terms, if a participant does not follow through with her contract there is a
reduction in her grant amount. In Minnesota, it begins with a 10 percent reduction and continues

to 30 percent with vendor paid rent and utilities (H.R. 2561.46,1997). The goal of these
sanctions is to give participants consequences for not working toward economic self-sufficiency.

By the year 2A0Z states must have at least 50Vo of families receiving Federal assistance working
at least 30 horrrs per week or they

will lose funding, if goals continue not to be met the state

could lose up to 21 percent of funding (Lamer et al., L997|, The goal of this contract for the
Federal govemment is to motivate states to continue efforts to move people into work and be

creative in their efforts to do so within the diversrty of the state.

A final aspect of the social conftact between families and the govemment is time limits.
MFIP-S establishes a five-year lifetime

limit on cash assistance

and a two-year lifetime limit on

receiving assistance without working (Casse, t9971. The goal is to avoid welfare becoming a
way of

life. This

contract has extreme consequences for participants, they must become

economically self-sufficient during the time that the govemment is willing to suppofi them, or
they will be forced to do so on their own with no supports. As discussed, the social contract

involved with welfare reform is a shong stance that has the potential for unfavorable results.
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Whether it comes to participants losing benefits or the states losing money, the fact is that if the
intended goals of welfare reform are not achieved there will be outcomes that have the potential

to affect people's lives.
Reward atld homote lVork
Under past welfare policies, families lost benefits when they worked, present Minnesota
welfare efforts have created financial incentives for welfare recipients to work (Reckers et aI.,

1997). In every case a family always has a higher income when the adult(s) work as opposed to
when they do not. By moving persons into the labor force through these financial incentives,
policymakers hope to change their work patterns, increase their incomes and reduce their

dependency. The potential importance of financial incentives to promote work

a.s

part of the

route to self-sufficiency has heen recognized (Greenberg et a1., 1995). The strategy is that as the
pefiion begins working and her income increases, the government grant amount can slowly be

withdrawn at the sitme rate that the working wage income increa*ses until the income level
elevates to approximately tZWo of the poverty level (Reckers et al., 19971. This strategy of

rewarding work sEives to wean pefiions off assistance and into self-sufficiency. This natural
transition demonsffates the govefltment's belief that persons need incentives for working, but that

it should only be temporary and not a lifetime entitlement (Larner et al., 1997),
Today, the policy promoting work has drawn a harder line for welfare recipients than in
the past. Not only is

work promoted, it is mandatory. Recipients must work in exchange for

benefits, making free cash entitlements a thing of the past (Reckers et al., 1997). Making work
mandatory, attempts to meet several of the intended goals of welfare reform. First, it reinforces
personal responsibility reviving the American value of the work ethic (Larner et al., 1997).

kl

this corrntry, citizens overwhelmingly believe that people shoutrd work if they are able to do so
and that

if they

are receiving benefits they should do something in exchange for obtaining them.

Secondly, it incr,eases recipient's chance of hecoming inde,pendent. Research shows that those
who have wage income have an overwhelmingly higher probability of not living in poverty
(Mead, L994). Ttrirdly, it reduces dependency on the govemment. If a person is doing some

39

kind of work and confiibuting to society, she is saving the government money (Mead, t994\. As
shown to he apparent, cost is a major issue for this policy.
Suppofl Families and Reduce Poverty

In order for families to move out of welfare dependency, many most likely will require
necessary supports. It is important to note that these goals of supporting families and reducing

poverty are specific to Minnesota and not an intended goal of federal welfare reform. The new
weffiare system in Minnesota is prepared to provide families

with support for a given amount of

time. These supports include child care, health care, tansportation, job search, education, and
training (Reckers et al., 1997). Child care is provided if needed for a parent to work or go to

school. For families leaving welfare for a job, the state provides medical and child care services
paid for on a sliding fee scale. A health insurance program called MinnesotaCare will also be
availahle for low-income families that are working and not eligible for Medical Assistance. The
new reform eliminates old AFDC rules that encourage families to separate and discourage
marriage (Reckers et al., 1997) By providing these supports for certain capped amounts of time,
such as when a family is experiencing a hardship or they need help between jobs, the hope is that

poverty witl be reduced because persons wilt he supported in getting back on their feet (Casse,
L997). The key initiative used to reduce poverty is employment promotion, despite timelimits,
the goal is that financial incentive will support families until their wages increase and they move
out of poverty.

Simplify the WeHare System
The new welfare reform in Minnesota simplifies the application process by combining

rules, applications, eligibility, payment, and

ca.se management

Food stamps, and STRIDE (Reckers et al., 1997). By

of four prograrns - AFDC, FGA,

fi[ing out one application

the goal is that a

person or family will not be ptaced unnecessarily in a program that is not needed. A recipient

may only require emergency financial assistance or medical assistance and can be deterred from
becoming a participant of long-term welfare. The simplification of the system also aims at
making participants aurare of what the new program entitles, what is e4pected of them, and what

r0

their rights are in regards to the new system. By simplifying the new system, the goal is also that
implementation will be strengthened due to consistency among case workers,

If all staff

are clear

on program goals, then the hope is that the program will run more smoothly and efficiently
making sanctioning more effective.
Objectives of MFIP-S's Emptroyment and Training Component
The three main objectives of the employment and training component of MFIP-S is to
increase recipient participation in work programs, sEengthen implementation, and build ties to

the lahor market. Many programs of the past, and current ones in other states, are attempting
similar objectives. These objectives are based on criticism of past programs which rffere critiqued

for not serving enough pef,sons, not placing enough persons in jobs, and not helping persons
move off of welfare which were mainly blamed on weak implementation of programs.
Most of the weHare to work program in the 1980's only served S-LSVo of all AFDC
adults, in the 1990's this has shifted to attempts to serve a majority of all recipients (Nightengale

& Holcomb, 1997). This is apparent in regards to requirements for single-mothers,

mandates

being placed, and sanctions being implemented. Under the \t/IN program mothers were exempt

if their children were under the age of six, then during JOBS mothers were exempt if their
children were under the age of three, now under current reform in the state of Minnesota mothers
are only exernpt

if their child is under one. They also can only claim this exemption one time in

their lifetime (Handler

& Hasenfeld, 1997). Mandates

are sfiong under MFIP-S, and it is only

allowed for 20Vo of the welfare population to be exernpt from requirement to participate in the
employment and fraining progf,am (H.n. 256J.01, 79971. Minnesota has also stengthened the
sanctions imposed on clients for not participating. Not only can persons lose part of their grant

but they can be permanently cut from receiving henefits if they fail to be engaged in job activity

within two years. Minnesota has broadened job activity to include job search, education,
training, and employment but still imposes a 40 hour a week mandate on participants. The
ohjective is to increase recipient's participation in work activrty by making only a small
percentage exempt and mandating work activity.
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Another objective of the employment and training program is to sffengthen
implementation by executing programs effectively and efficiently. Past evaluations of programs
have showed that many failed because they did not enact the program properly (Nightengale

&

Holcomb , 1997). If the goal of welfare reform is to attach persons to the labor force, and provide

them with necessary supports to do so, then all case workers need to be reaching for this same
goal and implementing job searches that meet this goal. For instance, if welfare policy reform
makes work and employment top priority but local welfare offices emphasize procedures that

document eligibitty for cash assistance, little progress toward goals will be achieved. Another
aspect of stenglhening implementation is tightening up on sanctions. By having this strong

irnplementation of the program the hope is that other goals such as increased participation and
increased ties to the labor market will be achieved.
The last objective discussed here is that the policy wants to attach persorui to the labor

market. The hope is that by increasing participation in activities, participants will be ld on the
most direct path to unsubsidized employment (Reckers et al., 1997). This could be one of the

biggest challenges faccd by the program because understanding and working with the labor
mad<et is something that is only modestly addressed. Since the unemployment rates ale low

right

now in Minnesota then this Uansition may be more likely to occur in a more successful manner,
but employers must be willing to hire participants who have few skills and a scarce work history

(Rwkers et al., L997). Research does show that given the rieht opportunity and supports many
are able and willing to work (Handler

& Hasenfeld, 1997). There

is definitely no single answer to

this multifaceted prohlem.

Underlying Assumptions and Values
"Welfare policy is fundamentally a set of symbols that conveys what behaviors are

virfitous and what are deviant" (Handler & Hasenfeld, t997, p. 4). It is shaped by the values and
assumptions of society as a whole, and the history of welfare policies shows

this. Some

assumptions and values have remained throughout time, hut others emerge as time elapses and
the people of this country change. Crrrrently, welfare reform is about issues such as immigration,

t2

family sftrcture, sexual behavior, work habits, cultural pluralism, arrd personal responsibility.
Society fails to recognize how stmctural issues in our country cause societal ills such as
dependency and welfare; instead blaming those who are the result of these issues. It is much
easier to blame those on welfare than to look at our nation as a whole and make fiurdamental

changes. Because society's assumptions and values conceming the citizens of our country have

exteme influence on welfare policy, it is appropriate to state these major beliefs at this time.
The literature discusses many of the beliefs that mold welfare policy, but in general four

major assumptions and values emerge: (1) an assumption that welfare dependency is a problem

of attitude, a moral failure to five up to the American value of work ethic, (2) abelief in the value
of personal responsibility which assurnes that able-bodied persons can and should wor,k, (3) an
assumption that if persons are

fully employed than they rvill be independent of welfare, fulfilling

the American value of self-sufficiency, (a) an assumption that welfare dependency causes and
perpetuates the breakdown of American family values and ethics. These values and assumptions
are apparent across the country and in the state of Minnesota. Although Minnesota may be

different in some respects to the rest of the counEy, when it comes to how the community feels
about those on welfare there is not much of a difference. Therefore, these values and
assumptions

ire generalized across the country including Minnesota.

\York Ethic
It's like a broken record, "If people would be motivated and work they would not be

poor". The belief is that violating the work ethic is a moral fault, and should not he rewarded
\pith entitlements because these people are ultimately the "unworthy poor" (Handler & Hasenfeld,
L9971. Welfare policy then should preserve this moral code and not allow these individuals to

Iive off the hard eamed money of taxpayers. Other relating factors such as race and a pafriarchal
society are hardly recognized as barriers to working despite their obvious nature. Work ethic

initiatives continue to emphasize focus on the behaviors of individuals and how hard they make
efforts to work, Work ethic is defined as an honest effort and abilify to work to the extent that a
person is capable in order to care for themselves and their family.
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Today, people of color suffer the multiple burdens of harsh discrimination. Although it
ha-s been

proven that persons of color get paid significantly less than rrhites and continue to face

discrimination in the work force, the belief remains that the rea,$on they are over represented in
the dependent welfare population is due to lack of motivation and work ethic (Handler

&

Hasenfeld, 1997). This belief is evident in current welfare policy that does not address the issue

of race discrimination. The stereotypical weHare recipient is porffayed

as the black, greedy, lazy

welfare queen with six children and a freeloading boyfriend (Polliu, 1996). What should surprise
most is that this couldn't be farther from the tmth. Persons of color do not make up a rnajority of
the welfare population and most are motivated to work (Oliker, 1995). Due to the overwhetming
number of disadvantages that persons of color face it is amazing that they do not live up to the
stereotypes that surround them.
Despite the denials that we live in a patriarchal society, research shows it does exist

(Abramovitz, 1996; Handler & Hasenfeld, !997; Gueron, 1995). Wirhin this patriarchy, women
are at disadvantage, which contributes to the overahundance of blame that is placed on them. tn
the past, poor mothers had to work but were then condemned

for doing so because it was

believed that they should be home caring for their husbands and children (Handler

& Hasenfeld,

L997). Today, that source of blame has shifted to condemning mothers for not working,
claiming that they lack work ethic, have children to receive more money, and are not motivated.
Mothers that receive welfare benefits today are stigmatized by society also because of the
increasing number of mothers entering the work force. It is believed that if some can and do

work, then all mothers should have to. It has been widely rgnored by society that women work
in lorverpaying job sectors and make significantly less than men forsimilar johs (Crtreron, 1995).
Women's lives have been regulated by contradictory beliefs and an underprivileged position

(Abramovitz, 1996). It isn't a coincidence that the majority of weHare recipients are women,
women did not cause their welfare dependency, and a paffiarchal society did play a significant
role in women's' dependency on welfare (Handler

& Hasenfeld, 19971. Despite this, welfare

policy still aims to change attitudes of recipients not the structure of society.
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Personal Responsibility
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

of 1996

establishes the overwhelming assumption that people can and should take charge of their lives by

becoming fully employed; furthermore it presumes that the only barrier to a person's welfare
dependency is the lack of effort to push them into responsibility (Lamer et al., 1997). Once
again the blame is placed on the individual, assuming that she has caused her own problems by

not being responsible. Many believe that labor discipline must be enforced through segregation
and stigmatization, not working incentives (Handler

& Hasenfeld, 1997).

The new welfare

reform incorporates both ideologies, it encourages people to work through incentives hut
distinguishes between the working poor and the welfare recipient by stigmatizing the latter. Any
person who works hard, remains poor and is not exclusively or at all dependent on welfare, is

much more highly respected than a person who is (Handler

& Hasenfeld,

1997).

The biggest moral issue in this country is that there are persons who are able-bodied

that are still dependent on weHare (Handler

& Hasenfeld, L997).

One way to combat this

"problem" is to cut off cash assistance to these irresponsible persons who are not working. It is
assumed that they do not work because of their motivation, not other factors. Although welfare

reform does provide incentives for working and supports such as child care and health care, the
fact remains that in the end those able-bodied persons who do not ultimately become responsible

for themselves and their families will lose benefits (Sawhill, 1995).
Another widely embodied assumption is that past weHare policy induces some
responsible people to quit work. This belief recognizes that the sffucture of our system does
effect behavior, but it still stigmatizes those who continue to be what is believed to be
irresponsible (Lamer et aI., 1996). This includes those who engage in behavior such as bearing
children while on weHare, while unmaried, or while a minor; as well as, persons with alcohol
and chemical dependency issues. As a society we have little tolerance for persons who not only

fail to mold to our moral codes but then depend on us when they can't care for themselves. These
beliefs have molded our cuffent system.

[5

Full Employment and Self-Sufficiency

It is assumed that if persons are fully employed then they will be independent of
welfare, fulfilling the American value of self-sufficiency. The current approaches to welfare

reform emphasize this idea of seH-sufficiency and defines it as the absence of welfare not the
reduction of poverty (Handler
the same, and

if people

& Hasenfeld, 1997). Most

&ssume that welfare and poverty are

are free of welfare then they are free of

poverty. It is believed that if a

person would simply work a full-time job, then she would be able to care for herself and her

family. Many welfare programs of the past have been implemented

based on the assumption

that with appropriate help, multiple problem families eventually can become self-sufficient
(Handler

& Hasenfeld,

19971.

Previous programs which assumed that with proper incentives and sanctions recipients

will work have been relatively ineffective, but again policy makers have decided to continue with
these efforts (Handler

& Hasenfeld, 199?). tn the 1960's,

Congress moved toward the theory that

adults who receive welfare benefits should make good-faith efforts to become economically self-

sufficient, this came after increasing dissatisfaction of Americans with the current system (Blank

& Blum, L997).

Ttris idea of self-sufficiency has grown sfionger since then, and concem for the

as$urance of income support

for children has moved into the background. It is assumed that hy

forcing mothers to work, we are helping children because even if their mothers are finding lowwage, entry-level jobs, eventually they

will

obtain beffer paying jobs, and will avoid the harmful

consequence of poverty on their children (Kisker

& Ross, L997).

Once again, the assumption is

rnade that if people work and are independent of welfare, they will not be living in poverty.
One other important assumption regarding self-sufficiency is that once a recipient
hecomes

fully employed and off welfare for a short amount of time not only

sufficient but that they will remain that way for the rest of their

are they self-

life. This assumption

shapes the

idea of time-limited henefits in current welfare reform. lUhile politicians are focused on the

challenge of "putting welfare recipients to work", some researchers are concerned with the lack

of support persons receive after obtaining a job (Hershey & Pavetti , L997) "
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The Breakdown of American Family Values and Ethics

It is a.ssumed that welfare dependency causes and perpetuates the breakdown of
American family values and ethics. The belief is that the breakdown of the family and increase

in out of wedlock births has generated a class of long-term welfare recipients (Tierney, 1991).
Once again welfare recipients are left with the brunt of this blame. Increases in marital disruption
and single-parenthood have stimulated this considerable debate regarding whether or not welfare

dependency is clearly linked with these trends. Mclanahan and Garfinkel (1989) forrnd that the
poor of our country have been long defined as those who "operate outside the mainstream of

commonly accepted values", including those relating to family ethic. Many feel that welfare
recipients lack of living by accepted values has caused the position that they are in.
There is also the blame that is placed on the welfare system. This source of this blame

is

not necessarily because welfare helps women and children, but because past policies excluded

most intact families, thereby discouraging family formation and encouraging family breakdown

(Bell, 1987). While logic and a good bit of evidence does support these charges, it is difficult to
say what share of the responsibility should be on welfare because many other social forces have
also been proyen to influence farnily breakdown (Prigmore

& Atherton, 1986). As far back

as

the 1950's, when at least 19 states excluded children from benefits on the basis of their birth
status, welfare policy ha.s attempted to reduce hehavior that was not widely acceptable (Blank

&

Blum, L9971. Fifty years later, we are still attempting these same efforts through punishment and
loss of benefits, despite the fact that half a decade of these attempts produced liule change.

lJnder the new welfare policy there

a.re an

array of provisions *rat attempt to deal with

reinforcing family values, Unless states decide to, they are not required to provide aid to children
who were conceived while the mother was on welfare or to minor parents. States can choose to
deny aid if the family does not cooperate in the establishment of patemity and the obtainment of

child support. (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1997) The strongly held belief that welfine encournges or
is caused by family breakdown has exEeme affects on policy formation and the stigmatizing of
the

poor. Until a change is made, moral fault will continue to lie in the hands of the poor.
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AnalysisiCritique

In this analysis/critique section, several points urill be made. The issue of welfare
reform is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon and embarking on an analysis of such an
immense issue would he at best lengthy and rigorous. Therefore, this analysis is focused on the

employment and training component of MFIP-S concentrating specifically on single-mothers who
are American citizens ,

2t

or older (not considered a minor), and not pregnant or involved in a

domestic dispute. It is apparent, however, that we cannot separate one aspect of welfare reform

from all the rest in this analysis, so the other aspects will be discussed

as

they relate.

Every welfare policy initiative has silengths and limitations, the employment and

training component of MFIP-S is not exclusive to this. The criteria used to determine the
stengths and limitations of this policy are based on the intended goals and objectives stated in
the previous chapter. These include the ability of the policy to: (1) place and sustain participants
in johs on a short and long term basis; (2) move persons off dependency on welfare and reduce

poverty; (3) reduce costs; and (a) support families in their economic goals. Structud by these
intended goals, the employment and Eaining component of MFIP-S and single-mothers will be
discussed in relation to jobs, the labor market, poverty vs dependency, and children taking into

consideration the above mentioned issues. Finally, the analysis will adfuess the research question
posed: Will the employment and training component of MI|IP-S effectively meet its intended
goals of weHare reform for single-mothers?

The Ernployment and Training Component/Single-Mothers and Jobs
Minnesota's ability to meet its intended goals of increasing single-mother's participation

in the program, strengthening implementation of the program, flnd building single-mother's ties to
the labor market

will

be contingent on many

things. On one hand, there are many predictors that

point to possihle successes for women entering employment, but on the other hand there are
many barriers that could infringe upon these successes. Success will be dependent on MFIP-S
and the employment and

barriers.

taining component's ability and willingness to address these difficult
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Each participant is required to follow certain steps in her search for employment. These
steps go as follows:

(l)

orientation, (2) initial assessment, (3) the development of

a

job search

support plan; if the participant has not obtained employment in eight weeks then; (4) secondary
assessment, (5) development

of an employment plan; if the participant has lost or quit a job with

good cause then; (6) revision of job search support plan or employment plan. Single-parents are
expected to be engaged in work activity within six months of receiving benefits and two-parent

families immediately. Sanctions ire applied to those who do not comply with their plan unless
they show good cause for their failure. Education and training is limited to 1Z monlhs, with 24
months being considered but the second year must be paid back, Over 24 months of education
or training will not be approved.
The literature shows an overwhelming numher of barriers that single-mothers face when

attempting to become employed, remain employed, and become independent of welfare. One of
those barriers is human capital. Many single-mothers have little education, training, and work

skills. The literature shows that the assumption that these women don't want to work is an
unproven belief. So what is the employment and training component doing to face these

barriers? It is emphasizing immediate job placement Erith minimal education and taining.
Although finding these mothers a job will attain the immediate goal of attaching them to the labor

force, Harris (1993) found that job placement alone will not ensure welfare exits. This brings the
discussion to the next point which is job stability. As stated previously in this paper, job stability

is a large issue for many single-mothers, Handler and Hasenfeld (1997) stated that despite many
a.ssumptions single-mothers do rvork but often end up back on the weHare rolls within a year and

the cycle continues. Many attempt to exit welfare through work, but for a variety of reasons lack of health care, a breakdo'firn in child care, a sick child or family member, low-wages, and
jobs that do not last - they return to welfare (Handler & Hasenfeld 1997). Harris (1993) points
out that developing human capital through education and raining urill enhance the chances that
exits will be rapid and sustaining. MFIP-S's employment and fiaining component does offer 12
months of education or 24 months with a pay hack plan. The concem here is that with an
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emphasis on

work will participants choose to take advantage of this or be made aware that it is

available? It is the premise of this analysis that necessary education and training that increases
the probahility of long-term successful job placement, should not be over shadowed by
immediate job placement that may only produce short term successful job placement.
The current availability of jobs in Minnesota and across the country is not of main

concern. By the year 2000, the work force is expected to grow by some 600 million people or
27Vo (Johnston

& Packard, 1994). The Minnesota Department of Economic Security projects

a

remarkable 560,000 job openings in the state over the course of 1997, of which 310,000 will
require ahigh school diploma or less (Reckers et al., t997). There will be some competition for
jobs, however, with approximately 3.6 job seekers competing for each job (Reckers et at., 1997).
Once again single-mothers will be at a disadvantage when applying for these positions, because

many employers look at women with young children, as a possible inconvenience and the fact
that they have a sparse history of attachment to the work force does not help. MFIP staff report
that ahout one-third of participants have at least one significant barrier to employment and about
one-sixth have multiple barriers (Reckers et al., 1997). As those with the fewest barriers find jobs
and move off the rolls, will participants that are left he those who are the hardest to employ?

After thousands have moved into jobs,

wil

there be any jobs left that those who are the most

difficult to employ can obtain? In the study conducted by MDRC on Minnesota's pilot project
MFIP, results showed some promise. MFIP rtras successful in the short run for single-parent longterm recipients in r:rban areas but it did not have lasting effects on employment among long-term

recipients in nrral counties (Miller et al., 1997). These long-term rural single-parentrecipients
may he the hardest hit by time-limits, and although MDRC's study showed promise for urban
recipients, it did not study the long-term effects of job stability for either rural or urban recipients.
As previously discussed, the concem is single-mothers retaining jobs. Burtless (1997)

found that participants may be able to find jobs in the beginning, but for many reasons they also

will lose

jobs.

A strength of this policy is its understandins that initially finding a peffion a job

may not be enough. It allows for

a

revision of the plan to be made if they do lose or quit

a

job
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with good cause. The workforce centers in Minnesota also provide services to those not
connected with welfare. This is a definite strength because of its potential to deter per,sons from

applying or reapplying for assistance. Minnesota is prepared to address personal barriers by

providing necessary supports such as transportation, child care, health ca.re, and job search help,
but once again the reminder of time limits looms over participants. Minnesota also offers good
cause for failure to comply options and exemptions from the requirements of the employment

and uaining component. These are considered more lenient than other states, and the policy is
considered to be understanding toward problerns and issues that arise for participants (Reckers et

al., 1997).
Financial incentives and time-limits are two major facets that affect the employment and

taining component. As single-mothers turn to workforce centers they have the option of going
to school and receiving the typical grant or working and receiving

a

financial incentive. Faced

with time limils and the opportumty of making more money, it seems likely that many will
choose the latter. Even as a participant works she is still using up her time limit and in MDRC's

study it was found that MFIP participants stayed on welfare longer than AFDC participants
(lvtiller et a1., 1997). The first point made here is that persons will be using up their time limit
even as they work, and that the sfength of the program of providing a higher income incentive

for working could be the demise of participants and their families in the long nrn if their time
limit mns out and they still have not reached economic self-sufficiency. The second point is that
the lure is for the participant to begin work immediately thus giving up her opportunify to hetter
herself through education which Haris (1995) showed produced better long-term outcomes for
mafly barrier ridden single-mothers. As pointed out by many researchers, there are essentially
three different types of single-mothers attempting to move themselves into employment and their

families off of welfare. The first group will find work relatively easy and join the ranks of the

working poor relatively successfully. The second group will make the transition with more
difficulties, requiring greater support and assistance as well as more time on welfare due to the
likeliness that they will cycle on and off welfare. The last group will have problems and
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limitations that make it unlikely that they will find a place in the labor market at all (Lamer et al.,
1997; Handler

& Hasenfeld,

percentage may

1997; Harris, 1995) Minnesota does have hroad exemptions that a

fit into, but others will he taxed by their time limit when they

are unahle to

find

a

decent job that increases their income and leaves their family economically self-sufficient. These
persons

will need more time, increased support, and possibly more fiaining or education.
Other Minnesota issues involve time limits which have shengths and limitations,

Caseworkers are required to put participants on the most direct path to employment. Minnesota

policymakers have also placed more sfringent time limits, than what is mandated by the Federal
govemment, on participants allotted time to become employed. Single-parents must begin work
activities within six months and two-parent families immediately. Participants may be able to

find jobs more quickly and successfully but they are limited to reasons why they can refuse a joh
that is available to them. The state policy did, however, decide to give participants a five year

lifetime limit on benefits which could have been less under Federal policy. Using the stategy of
sEicter time limits for beginning work but allowing the maximum five year limit on benefits
seem$ to be a good approach. The strength of this approach is that it

will force participants to

begin their work activities early, giving them more time to utilize financial incentives and build
ties to the labor market while still having a safety

net. The current state statue only specifies

hours of participation for single-parents who have

a

job search support plan (30 hours per week).

Once the parent receives a secondary assessment and has an employment plan the statute is silent

on hourly requirernents. To clarify this issue, language was added in an "exempt rule" (effective
LZl22l97) which states the required amount of participation. Minnesota expects single-mothers to

work at least 20 hours per week in fiscal year 1998, at least 25 hours per week in 1999 and 30
hours per week in the year 2000. This could be interpreted as a strength or a limitation of the

policy. The flexibility of a mother heing able to work

less hours seems more realistic because

it

is often difficult for mothers to find and maintain full-time employment. It could be difficult

though in the long run when the time limits are enforced and a mother will be unable to support
her children on part time wages. It is the premise of this analysis that there will be short term
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successr of placing people in immediate employment. This may be tainted, however, by those

unahle to find jobs and long-term problems such as frustations overjob instability and concenu

for those facing time limits may also create increases of sEess and fear in participants. There is
no doubt that many panicipants will succeed, but there is also no doubt that many will be unable

[o and taking away their safety net will have adverse effects.
The Employnprrt and Training Component/Single-Molhe_Si-_rond the Labor Market

"Single-mothers do not tum to welfare hecause they are pathologically dependent on
handouts or unusually reluctant to rvork, they do so hecause they cannot get jobs that pay better
than welfare" (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1997, p. 49). If the goal of Minnesota's policy is to attach
single-mothers to the labor market, the government must work with the labor market and
understand

it.

Many researchers believe that policy must address two main issues in regard to the

labor markefi low wages and the establishment of how to work with and understand the lahor
market when training participants for, and placing them in, jobs (Handler
Bnrtless, 1997; Nightengale

& Hasenfeld, 1997;

& Holcomb, t9971.

As stated, the first issue is wages and rphat many catl the low wage labor market. Yes,
there are jobs and persons can obtain them, but the low wages paid are often not enough to
sustain a healthy family leaving many in poverty (Handler

& Hasenfeld, L9971. The thousands

of entry-level jobs in Minnesota vary greatly in pay and hours, and in their potential to support
families without govemment assistarce. The jobs in Minnesota that recipients are applying for
pay generally from $5-$10 hour, with experienced and educated workers looking at better wages.
Financial incentives are offered for those who are working welfare participants in the state of

Minnesota. Legislation was enacted as part of the state's welfare reforrn that the grant arnount a

family will receive is based on a "ftansitional standardu. This tansitional standard includes hoth
a cash and food

portion. It is raised by

LUVI when a

family works and is called the 'family wage

level", MFIP-S also allows a36Vo eamings disregard for families that work. The disregard and
farnily wage level combine to provide an incentive for MI|IP-S recipients to participate in the
work force, since families get to keep a part of their grant as they begin working. Under MFIP-S,
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families exit the program at approximately t20%o of the Federal poverty level (Beilis, 1997).

A

mother with one child would need to eam $6 an hour or $12,480 per year before exiting MFP-S.
(Reckers et al., 19971. In Table 4 on this page, Reckers et al., (1997) shows how much other

single-mother families need to make in order to leave MFIP-S and that larger families will need to
make considerable wages.

Table 4
The Ufagss

Family Size

Z
3

4
5

Nmmay to Itilove Off of MEIP-S for.Singlp-Parcnrs (f996)

H# b get off MFIPS

Fedmal Poverty Level

Hndy

Amral

Hourty

lBtrh of Fdcral

$5.00

$6.00

$6.25

$7.50

$7.50

$9.00

$9.90

$10.55

$10,360
$12,980
$15,600
t9,220

lf,age

Povefi5r

l-€rd

Note: The hourly wages represent 1 person working 40 hours a week. Hourly wages were
calculated by Minnesota Planning based on 2,080 hours per year.

Considering that Minnesota has a minimum wage of $S.15 an hour, Ieaving MFIP
completely is not a farfetched goal for many, but what may be disadvantageous is a singlemother with three children who will need to earn $9.00 an hour in order to lift her family above
to this level. An area that would supplement income for single-mother families is child support

which Minnesota is increasing exertions toward, but there will be those fathers who are absent,
disabled, incarcerated or for many others reasons unavailable or unwilling to pay child support.

Again, rural a.reas seem to be of highest concern because of pockets of regions that have few
year-round full-time jobs at any level that will lift families out of poverfy (Reckers et al., L997).
The financial incentive offered under MFIP-S is a strength because it gives participants an

54
incentive to work and always allows a family to make more working than not working. The
harsh realities of the low wage market prove that government funds should be used to
compensate for the shortcomings of private sector jobs (Larner et al., L997). In research

conducted hy the Manpower Demonshation Research Corporation (IUDRC) on the MFIP pitot
weHare project, it was found that the financial incentives and mandatory employment oriented
services appeared to reinforce each other (Miller et al., L997). Participants expressed more
interest in working after having financial incentives. A limitation of this is that it may be assisting
those who would have worked regardless of the incentive to work (Crreenberg et al., 1995). kr

fact, it has heen hypothesized that a financial incentive policy might induce some working
families to work less hecause they keep part of their benefits (Miller et al., IggT) Financial
incentives, once again are not offered forever, participants have a five year limit on receiving

them- This is a trimitation because although many will be able move up the pay scale and
increase their income within the five years, there

will be those who will not and their safety net

will be taken away regardless. It is the premise of this analysis that smaller single-mother
families that receive child support and live in urban areas where jobs are more readily available

will have a higher rate of success at moving into jobs and increasing income. Single-mothers
who have several children, do not receive child support and are living in a rural areas, will have
heightened rouble with moving off and staying off weHare.
As mentioned, the other challenge for successful welfare-to-work programs such

as

MFIP-S's employment and training component, is to understand and work with the labor market
because it is the dimension through which these prograrns expect to achieve success

(Nightengale

& Holcomb, 1997). One way of doing this is to look

at the kinds of jobs available

and train participants accordingly. Another strategy is to cultivate relationships with employers
and companies in order to receive information regarding available jobs and set up fiaining for

employment- The Minnesota Job Skills Partnership is one effort that places blocks of welfare
participants into contracted jobs with certain companies. There are also other initiatives that
promote nonprotit organizations and public institutions,

it.s

well as, colleges and school districts
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to increase their hiring rates for those moving off of welfare. Minnesota's workforce centers are
strong and have professionals who work with and understand Minnesota's labor market. The
number of workforce centers available are supposed to double as the reform is initiated, and
should be huilt upon using increasing creativity in order to meet the needs of participants and the
intended goals of the government. (Reckers et a1., 1997). Research shorps that
a large numher of recipients into the paid labor force, employers

as

reform forces

will and do have the resources

to create jobs. Two problems, though, are predicted to possibly arise. One is that employers will
be induced to create jobs and hire participants only if the prevailing wage for unskilled workers is
reduced, lowering the pay they must give in exchange for work. Secondly, the labor force will
eventually become saturated with workers, making jobs more competitive and less available
(Burtless

, L997). Workforce centers will have to work with these challenges and adjust

as

needed to deal with changes and problerns that emerge. Many single-mothers have few skills
and the labor market has been a difficult system for them to attach to, this policy only addresses

this issue minimally by offering education and training for a limited amount of time. It is the
premise of this analysis that Minnesota's workforce centers have a strong labor market

connection, but in order to continue to succeed in placing single-mothers in jobs where they have

job stability and job growth, current efforts must continue to be built upon, creative programs will
need to be developed, and human capital strategies may need to be increased.
ThE Emplovment and Training ComponentflSingle-Mothers and Poverty vs Dependency

"Of those single-mothers who exit welfare through earned income, about 4frVo remained

poor", (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1997, p. 46). The underlying assumption that if a person works
full-time she will not be poor has shaped the policy goal of decrea.sing dependency by attaching
persons to the labor

force. What

has heen misconstrued is the belief that then these persons

would be lifted out of poverty. The research shows that this is often not true and many working
single-mothers are still living in poverty. The Urban Institute estimated that when welfare reform
is fully phased in, an estimated 2.6 million additional people will fall into poverty, including 1.1

million children (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1997). As stated previously, two-thirds of those on
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welfare are children making it inevitable that they will be affected.

In Minnesota the picture does look somewhat better for single-mothers than in the rest
of the country. MDRC found in its study of MFIP that the program increased income and
reduced poverty among single-parent applicants, but a majority of the increase came from the

financial incentives of the program. The impacts of MFIP for single-parent long-term recipients
in rural counties showed thatTl%o still remained rrnder the 1994 poverty level. It should be
noted, however, that this was tLVo lower than those who were on AFDC (Miller et aI., 1997).
The evidence is fairly plain in regards to poverfy, a large percentage of long-term recipients,

if

forced to rely on their own wages (without financial incentives supplementing their income),

would almost certainly remain poor even if they worked full time on a year round basis (Burtless,

1997). In

cases where a single-mother makes at least L20Vo of the poverty level and is moved

off welfare, she may still fall below the poverty level after subtracting the costs of tansportation,
child care, and other expenses. However, in Minnesota some can receive food slamps, child
care, and health care unlimited which

will make a difference in whether or not they will live in

poverty. This is another stength of Minnesota policy and services.
The issue of dependency is a separate issue from poverty. Self-sufficiency has heen

defined by policymakers as being off welfare, not being out of poverty (Handler

& Hasenfeld,

1997). The five-year limit on benefits fulfills the underlyine value that assistance should only be
temporary, for times of hardship. It also moves people off dependency on welfare, but not out of

poverty. Minnesota shows great promise to move persons into the work force and off of
dependency on weHare especially with the time limit and mandates. Many single-mothers will
face the rigors of the private labor market without a safefy net making welfare reform rules more

like the real world where hard work is necessary to get ahead and where there are few guarantees

of income security (Lamer et al., 1997). It was found by MDRC's research of MFIP pilot project
that financial incentives actually prolonged dependency on welfare (Miller et al., 1997) Persons

remained on welfare longer through financial incentives, because of the allowance to combine
welfare and work. There are both silengths and limitations in regards to financial incentives and
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its effect on dependency vs poverty. A stenglh is that persofls are guaranteed to have more
income in the short term because financial incentives make them better off economically,
decreasing poverfy. A limitation is that in the long run some will use up their time limit and

move back into poverty, increasing poverty. Another limitation is that financial ince,rrtives

prolong dependency, however, the policy will meet the intended goal of reducing dependency in
the long run

a-s

time runs out and benefits are taken from participants. It is the premise of this

analysis that initialty, poverty

will decrease and dependency will increase, but then a sffi will

occlrr increa.sing poverty and decreasing dependency.
AIso in regards to dependency, it must be recognized that a portion of the population

will never be ahle to become independent of vrelfare. Among the single-mothers looking for
work, there are many that have disabilities, mental illness, addiction, illness, or borderline mental
retardation. Although there may be nonprofit organizations willing to address these issues the
fact remains that a majority of them will be unable to raise their children and work in
unsubsidized employment. Twenty percent of the weHare population is allowed to be exempt

from the working requirements of welfare reform and can remain on welfare without facing
sanctions. This allowance seems generous and adequate enough to cover those unable to work,
but it is the premise of this analysis that more than twenty percent of the total welfare population
may need exemption because of the barriers they face.
The Employment agd Traininq Component/lsingle-Mothers and their Children
lVelfare reform policymakers have made maily attempts to protect children without
excusing their parents from responsibility. In past decades, society's frustration with the weHare
program has heightened, and the children dependent on it have become lost in the rhetoric. It is
estimated that two-thirds of welfare recipients are children, making them not only the most

numerous but the most vulnerable (Lamer et al., 19971. Although there are many rElercussions
that children may suffer due to weffiare reform, this analysis will discuss one aspect - the
increased emphasis on employment for single-mothers that the employment and training
compone,nt is hoping to achieve. A program that was originally designed to allow mothers to
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stay home and raise their children no longer exists, instead close to every single-mother is
expected to work.

Children's needs have not gone altogether forgotten. Funds are provided in Minnesota
to pay for licensed child care and irccess to health care for children is someq/hat protected
{Reckers et al-, L997). However, children's well*being remains threatened by poverty, because
most single-mothers only find low-wage employment, and crisis may occur

unable to find work or increase their income within the five-year

if their mother

is

limit. No literature was found

on the impacts of single-mother employment on children without a safety net (like the new
weHare reforrr,r), but there have been studies conducted on the children of previous AIIDC singlemothers where lhere was a safety net or altemative to employment. What will be discussed next
are the consequences that may result

for chilfuen whose mothers move from welfare into the

labor force.
"Some believe that rvelfare policies that expose poor single-mothers to harsh living

conditions will increase their desire to work and discourage unwed childbearing", (Larner et al.,
L997, p.

9).

Regardless of how tough these policies will be on mothers, they

will also impose

tou8h hardships on the children who now rely on welfare's support. The literature suggests that

it

is not the fact that mothers are working that negatively affects their children it is the vtrages,
conditions, afld hours of the employment that promotes adverse effects (Larner et al., L997:

Handler&Hasenfeld, 1997; Moore&Driscoll, 1997;Zaslow&Emig, 1997). Forexample,
Zaslow and Emig (1997) found that even among low-income families, maternal employment has

positive irnplications for children urhen working conditions are favorable and wages are at a
livable standard. Moore and Driscoll (1997) ageed and stated furthermore that research suggests
no evidence that matemal employment harmed the cognitive abilities of children. Research does
suggest, however, that the conditions associated with poverty have damaging effects on

children's success in school and as adults (Larner et al., L997) It is not single-mother's
employment that harms children it is the effects of poverty. Most helieve that work and children
are important, there must be a way to support and encourage both.
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Minnesota is attempting to encourage work, yet support children. The new Federal

policy does increa.se state funding and flexibility and Minnesota has guaranteed child care for
welfare parents who work as well as a sliding fee program for low income, non welfare parents
who work. Licensed child care is in short supply, though, and options
needing care during evenings, nights, or weekends.(Reckers et

a1.,

a.re

limited for parents

1997) ttre sliding fee

progrilm will be heneficial for the working poor, but this alone may not raise families out of the
poverty that is harmful to children. It is the premise of this analysis that there ruill be a
percentage of single-mothers who will find employment that has wages that grow and pull them

out of poverfy, making matemal employment a positive effect on their children. There will also
he families that remain in poverty, even after mothers find jobs or after the time limit takes effect
and this lack of a safety net

will have consequences for c,hildren.

Research Question

Will the employment and Eaining component of MFIP-S effectively meet the intended
goals of welfare reform for single-mothers? The answer to this question has to be yes and

no. It

will decrease dependency on welfare hy enforcing time limits and rnoving a high percentage of
participants (approximately 75Vo in the long run) into employment. Poverty, however, will most

likely increase

as participants are pushed

off the program when they do not comply or their time

runs out. The goal of implementation will be strengthened with mandates and sanctions. Ties

will be built to the labor market through the policy's emphasis on direct unsubsidized
employment strategies and a labor market in Minnesota that is in dire need of workers. Families

will be supported through child care, health care, and other services. These supports will not be
provided for a lifetime, though, and families may breakdown under burdensome conditions.
What will happen urith Federal and state dollars remains to be seen. H the policy keeps
its mandate sEong and refuses to increase funding, yes it will decrease, but

if

widespread poverty

occurt and the government decides to fund supportive measures, then no it will not. The
incomes of sorne families will increase in the short-nrn due to financiat incentives, but when their
time is up, it is likely that incomes will decrease. WeHare reform in Minnesota offers both risks
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and opportunities. Fortunately, yet unfortunately for participants in other states, Minnesota looks

good in comparison to the rest of the countr5r, due to generous social programs and strong public

community support.
IdenJification of Altemative Employment Promotion Strategies
Current welfare policy strategy in Minnesota is direct employment promotion sfiategies.
This includes job search assistance, self-directed job search,

a.s

well as, job development and

placement with the goal consisting of placing the participant in the most direct path to
unsubsidized employment. MFIP-S's employment and taining component does offer short-term

taining and education, but the focus of the program is direct employment stategies. There are
two other types of alternative strategies that could be implemented. One consists of services
directly related to the individual, including job training strategies, education strategies, subsidized
public employment strategies, and mixed strategies. The other consists of stategies related to
factors outside of the individual such as changes in the low wage labor market and joh creation.

In the following paragraphs, these strategies will he discussed in relation to cost issues, effects on
promoting employment, and long term outcomes.
Job Traitinq Stategies

Typical job taining strategies consist of classroom occupational training by a Eaining
or educational institution such as a coflImunity college or vocational school, community based
organization, or a nonprofit or for profit training center. It also consists of on the job training

with public or private sector employees who usually receive a subsidy to cover

a

portion of the

wages paid during the training period. The employer subsidy may be drawn from weHare or

food stamp payments that would have otherwise been paid to the individuat. Holzer (1996)
stated that the lack of skills among AFDC recipients

will constitute the greatest problem they face

in the job market. Based on this, one would a.ssume that job raining stategies would be
heneficial if not necessary. Dickinson (1986), in support of ttris statement, stated that in the

Work Incentive Program (Wlttl) vocational training for women and on-the-job training for men
and women had a greater effect on their earnings than did other more generic procedures such

a.s

direct job search. Nightengale and Holcomb (1997) also found that

intenrrr-:ing

silategies

have had only modest impacts on employment and eamings especially in the short-term. Holzer

(1996) despite his statement regarding participant skill level, found that most taining programs
across the

county generated only modest improvements in employment and eamings, but did

find that training linked to specific jobs seelns more successful than general classroom taining.
Overall, it was found that training can be very costly and in general, outcomes were not

overwhelmingly convincing to policymakers that these programs were beneficial. In the longterm, however, training programs may make a difference in a person's ability to perform specific

job duties and compete for an employment position (Nightengale & Holcomb , lggV).
Educational Strategies
Education sEategies include remedial education such as preparation for a GED, basic

skills instruction in reading and mathematics, or EnglishJanguage classes for persons whose
primary language is not English. It also includes post secondary degree programs for a.ssociate
or bachelor degrees that are generally funded by grants, Federal loans, or scholarships.
Educational strategies can be very expensive especially if participants engage in longterm educational programs, but as stated earlier. participants often lack necessary skills that can
assist them in the

job market. Many studies suggest that like training, building human capital

through education does not yield as large of an effect as do labor force attachment strategies
(Niehtengale

& Holcomb , 19971. But what

about building the skitls of participants? Proponents

of the human capital approach claim that investments in training and education have been
positively affecting the outcomes of progriilns that emphasize them. Most agree though that
education and training should not be entirely sacrificed for immediate job search and placement

(Holzer, 1996; Nightengale & Holcomb , 1997; Haris, 1993). Holzer (1996) found that early
education strategies may be more successful then "after the fact" education, stating that programs
that help with reducing high school drop out rates and early work experience rvhile in high

school not only would be more cost effective but mfly deter many from the welfare rolls. In the

GAIN program in California, no clear link was found substantiating that the basic education
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requird by the program increased earnings and employment, but it is hard to believe that it did
not have an impact on the success of the program (Gueron, 1995). In terms of using education
and training as a primary component, a study by Manpower Development found ttrat prograrns
that utilize such a strategy produce few,

if any gains in income

(Crrunwald, 1997). Reed (1994),

however, states clearly that efforts torvard education and taining may be fairly expensive but
they offer long-run rewards for the govemment as well as participants. It stands [o reason that
education progrirms do not produce immediate results, but over the long-run they most likely will

improve

a person's

overall situation, and future chances of finding and maintaining

a

job.

These

prografirs are costly and often can only serve a small number of participants, however, and
support for them by society and policymakers is lacking.
Suhsidized Publiq.Employment SEategies
Subsidized public employment sfiategies consist of work experience which can include

unpaid workfare assignments where recipients work in exchange for welfare benefits, or shortterm unpaid work experience designed as hasic exposnre to the work environment. Stipends are
sometimes provided to the workers. There is also community or public service jobs where

individuals reccive wages, typically minimum wage or slightly helovr, for the hours that they

work. (Niehteneale & Holcomb, 1997).
Worldare programs that require panicipants to work for their welfare benefit, have been
at best conffoversial regarding the success or failure of their implementation. The small number

of studies that have heen done on such programs shows mixed results. Critics claim thar
workfare programs lead to dead-end jobs, the displacement of public employees, and leave
participants no better off than they qrere before they began the program, while proponents argue
that the on-the-job-experience that participants receive has a potentially auspicious effect on

futrue employment and it can potentially deter persons from welfare (Dickinson, 1986). [t has
been shown that workfare programs are feasible and the work completed does offset costs, but
states have had

rouble developing work sites, and the programs in general did not develop

people's skills and did not prompt them to move more quickly into unsubsidized employment or
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deter welfare applicants (Gueron, 1995). Reed (1994) agreed with Gueron (1gg5) on points
related to the lack of workfare programs improving the skills and employment of participants
and
stated that worldare is arguably both the least effective and the most expensive option on the

table. Despite Gueron's (1995) findings, other researchers still concluded that worldare is a
necessary, useful employment program. Besharov (1995) emphasized positive outcomes
such as

increasing seH-discipline, skills of participants, and most importantly social contracts that
discor"uage future possible weHare applicants from thinking that a life on weHare is an atffactive

option- [n terms of cost, Besharov (1995) stated that alfhough workfare does not immediately
reduce caseloads, the value of services rendered coupled with other savings, exceeded
the

program's co$t to tax payers.

If welfare policies include

a mandatory rnork component, public

service employment may be necessary, yet more cosfly policy, to guarantee employment for the
least advantaged who are unable to find work in the private sector.

Mixed Stategies

A mixed strategy approach provides services that can include many of the programs
just mentioned plus ongoing counseling, education, and pe€r support.
Overall, a mixed strategy
approach has proven to be popular qdth most

if not all researchers. Most importantly it is

emphasized that every state and more specifically county, have differing needs and populations
and that adapting programs to
1996; Night€ngale

fit the needs of the specific

& Holcomb, 1gg7). Nightengale

area is crucial (Crueron, 1g95; Holzer,

and Holcomb (1gg7) stated that

comprehensive mixed strategies that integrate basic education with vocational Eaining and job
search assistance have a good impact on employment and Eaining. Marry welfare to work

initiatives limited emphasis to one or more program components which research shows to be

insufficient due to the diverse employment needs and experiences of even participants within a
specific county (Dickinson, 1986). Therefore, not only do programs need to consider the

dffiering needs between counties hut also within counties. According to Crueron (1gg5)
Rverside's GAIN program was able to do this successfully by using a mixed strategy coupled

with a wide variety of other supportive services that was unique to the area and the different
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participants within the program. Mixed strategies can be costly due to the amount of time it may
take to put together the right amount of stategies for a particular participant, but over time they

show more positive effects in terms of continued independence (Nightengale

& Holcomb,

1997).

The Low Wage Labor Market

Addressing issues witldn the low wage labor market is a strategy that consists of
recognizing that there are factors oulside of the individual that influence her employment. These
issues include

job creation, rtrage subsidies, raising of the minimum wage, subsidized child and

health care, child support efforts, changes in unemployment insurance, flnd changes in disability
insurance (Handler

& Hasenfeld, L997).

Reasoning behind labor market changes is that there are

high numher of persons who are working but they are still living in poverty, an estimated LBVI af
futrl-time workers earned less than the poverty line

in L992. Handler & Hasenfeld (1997) state

that between 1973 and 1990 the median income declined and real wages of the less skilled

worker have deteriorated significantly. Nightengale and Holcomb (1997) stated that the weakest
part of the curre.nt programs administered by welfare agencies may be their poor understanding

of the labor market.
The state of Minnesota has made changes and added supporls in regards to many of the

above altematives. Subsidized child and health care

a.s

well as child support efforts and tax

credits are included in the state's attempt to support working individuals (Reckers et al., 1997).
But still other efforts are lacking. Job creation, although cosfly, is considered necessary because

if jobs are not available, no amount of job development and skill raining siill lead to
employment. The demand side of the welfare/work equation must be addressed through
stimulating new jobs in economically depressed areas and puhlic investrnents in local
communities (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1997). Wage subsidies have been criticized for the stigma
placed onto disadvantagd workers, but many favor wage subsidies because they believe that it

will increase the hiting of weHare recipients (Holzer, 1996). This combination of demand/supply
incentives may enact a wfur/win situation for both employers and employees. Handler and
Hasenfeld (19971state that these incentives would balance the employment opportunities of the
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low-wage, low-skilled worker at a reasonable cost and raise the incomes of the loru-skilled

worker. Raising the minimum wage is another proposal that has brought about conEoversy.
Many feel that because the minimum wage is so low it would be a good policy initiative, but
economists believe that raising the minimum rrrage would decrease employment, reduce benefits,
and raise prices making it an ineffective method of relieving poverty (Handler

& Hasenfeld,

1997). It seems reasonable to assume that even in the state of Minnesota where the minimum
wage is high, that raising it would at least improve the incomes of persons who are trying to live

off of such a low vrage. Reforming unemployment insurance (tII) and disability insurance (DI)
are modest reforms yet important. Nonetheless, studies confirm that disability is an important

contrihutor to poverty and it limits the ability of welfare recipients to work (Handler

& Hasenfeld,

L9971. Reforming DI to enable beneficiaries to work could raise them and their dependents out

of poverty, Critics claim that UI's inability to include women in the available benefiB, because
they often work intermittently and many do not maintain full-time employment, is a problem that
affects welfare recipients since 90Vo are single-mothers (Handler

& Hasenfeld, 1997). Although

society believes that it is individual fault that lands persons in poverty, research shows that these
beliefs are false and making changes outside of individuals could be crucia} to meeting intended

goals. Alternatives to promoting employment that are geared toward making changes in the way
that a program enforces participation and determines eligibility are discussed next.
Alternatives to Enforcement and Eligibility
Other alternatives that have been widely discussed in the literature include universal
meiLtures and variations of enforcement of time limits, sanctions, md mandates. Universal
measwes are approaches that are not means tested which means that anyone can receive the
benefits regardless of income. A universal approach would lift the stigmatization off of

participants and allow more working poor to benefit from social progrums. Handler and
Ha.senfeld (1997) believe that a universal program would sustain and support single-mothers who
are already working, create a trusting relationship between workers and participants, and improve
the lives of children whose parents are working in the low wage labor market. Critics of this
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initiative helieve that punishment and stigmatization are necessary components in motivating
persons and that it would be overwhelmingly expensive to develop and operate (Burtless

Nightengale

,

LggT;

& Holc,omb, l99T).

Variations in the enforcement of time limits, sanctions, and mandates have also been
discussed in the literafure. Time limits seem to be of more consem, however, because of the risk

of increased poverfy. By widening the exemptions of those at risk for running out of time, many
could be spared from losing their benefits especially important in cases where children are

involved. (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1997) Mandating participation is not

as much

of a concem

because many do want to work and would so voluntarily, but flexibility in the amount of hours

required to work and in what is defined

iLS

approyed "work activify" could be widened. Some

previous programs had exftemely broad categorizations of activities that were approved, that
included such things as counseling and treatment. These programs did show modestly positive
affects hecause per$ons were allowed to address other issues that would possihly impede their
success

in a job (Bunless, 1997). In terms of sanctions, most literature has shown that they are

not a necessary enforcement, but proponents insist that sanctions are essential in order to ensure
fhat participants know that the policy is a serious one (Handler

& Hasenfeld,

1997).
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Chapter V: Implications

Welfare reform and the problems associated with it, is an issue that is not going flway
anytrme soon,

if ever. It is an also an issue that has many implications.

are implications for future research and implications

The two discussed here

for social work practice.

Implications for Futr.rre Research
For 30 years policymakers have been making attempB at promoting work through
many welfare reforms, and for 30 years they have been disappointed. Now that another policy
has heen drafted and is being implemented, we can once again leam from the mistakes and

prosper on the successes. There are many important recornmendations that have been made
regarding future research of the new policy, Some that have stood out include aspects of costs,
dependency, the labor market, effects of time limits, poverfy, effects on children, and effects on
families.

In MDRC's study of MFIP, short term results showed that welfare ca.seloads and costs
increased (Miller et al., L997). The hope is that costs

will decrease as more peniorui move off of

welfare and into work, this is a significant issue to study as time goes on. To the extent that this
can be done, by moving weHare participants directly and permanently into the labor market,
states may face little sEain, but

if the transition proceeds more slowly or stagnantly, than

additional funds may be necessary to reach goals (Nightengale, t9971. Future research regarding
the use of funds to maintain employment programs and costs of financial incentives will nmd to
be conducted also.

MDRC's study also leaves future questions for long-terrn recipients and whether or not
the combination of welfare and work will eventually lead to them becoming independent of
weHare (Miller et al., 1997). Will MFIP-S recipients be able to begin working and remain

employed,

if so, rvill

their jobs allow them to move into full-time and higher wages? This is a

question that only time can anstver, flrrd a question that will need to be explored. The sfrategies
used must be examined in terms of what promotes dependency in contrast to supporting

independence (Mason et al,, 1985). What has failed in the past must he abandoned or revamped.
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It has been again and again pointed out by researchers that knowing and working with
the labor market is crucial to the success of welfare policies that promote work (Handler
Hasenfeld, L997). As time

pa-sses,

&

the labor market changes, and as more and more persons

move into jobs, employment opportunities change. These are changes that need to be rnonitored
and programs should be assessed based on these changes. The labor market also may need

policies that make changes within it to help welfare progrirms, such
u/age and job creation. The lahor market is a key aspect that

as raises

in the minimum

will need to be monitored and

considered as welfare reform fully phases in.
The new era of time limited welfare is particularly relevant to future research. It is the

first of its kind legislation that no longer provides a safety net for citizens. Will five years be
enough time for persons to find employment and become self-sufficient? Once again time will

tell, and researchers will need to study the effects of time limits in the future.
The critique of welfare reform programs has concenfrated primarily on the adult

recipients, with lifile attention given to the effects on children (Miller et al., L997). Reearch
shows that family income and stability can influence outcomes for children and welfare reform
has the potential to affect the futr:re of these children. Especially with timeJimits being enforced,

children have the potential to get lost in the enforcement of welfare mandates. Future research
needs to be conducted regarding the wetl-being of children in light of the new welfare policy.
Past reforms have been attacked because they promote the breakup of families and out

of wedlock childbearing, the new reform hopes to discourage children born to unwed mothers
and keep families together. Fufure research should be conducted to study the effects fhat the

current policy has on families. Will the tough rneasures prevent women from having children out

of wedlock and will it keep families together? Some say it will but others disagree. Those who
think it will, betrieve lhat a message will be sent to women convincing them to wait until they are
married or financially stable to have children (Besharov, 1985). Proponents say that we will see
more children livirrg in foster care or with family members as mothers fail to be able to support
their children (Handler

& Hasenfeld,

1997).
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What may he most perplexing in regards to future research would be quantitative or
qualitative studies that looked at the outcornes of this reform and interviewed staJf and recipients.
The people that live the reform could most likely give the true story concerning the successes and

failures of this program. Future researchers can interview recipients who moved out of the
program and inquire as to how they accomplished that, as well

a-s,

those who remain on welfare

or were forced off due to failnre to comply or an enforced time-limit. After the program has
taken its course for several years, many studies can be conducted that review the true impact of
this reform and answer ma.ny of the questions discussed in this analysis.
Implications for Social lVork Practice
Social workers also will be key in advocating efforts for policy change and program

development. The job of the social worker could be tougher or simpler depending on the state,
the program, and the client, Because most who are working directly with participants in
employment programs will not be social workers, responsibilities of social workers will be seen

mainly in other agencies and institutions.
Locating resources for families could prove to be a difficult task for social workers in
the future, In situations where a family moves to Minnesota from a state where they used up their

time-limit, social workers may have few means to draw on to assist these families with support.

In other situations where a parent does not or cannot adhere with policy requirements and a child
is involved, social workers may have few options in protecting that

child. An increase in child

protection cases as well as foster care placements is predicted to possibly occur.
Social workers may need to advocate more for the poor and utilize program

development and policy administration expertise in order to promote necessary changes that
meet the needs of client populations. It may be necessary for social workers to be the voices

of

the poor, and possibly one of the few professions that believe in supporting oppressed

populations to facilitate change, not placing them and their children into harsh conditions in order

to make them change.
Having financial incentives and necessary supports to offer elients may make the social
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workers job ea-sier when working with clients who have ilever used 'welfare and need it for

temporary support. It may even assist with those families who ire on welfare but have the right
education and skills as well as opportunities in order to move off of welfare. The tougher cases

will be those who have multiple barriers or are already facing their time-limit without being able
to independently support themselves. In Minnesota, exemptions

a.re broad

for families that are

facing multiple barriers, hut in other states this is not the case. However, in the state of
Minnesota, millions of families will be pushed of govemment assistance and face a brutal
existence in which social service organizations may be their only source of support.

7t
Chapter

VI:

Discussion/Recommendations

What is most perplexing for this researcher is the situation of poverty in America and

how this affects families and the future of children. As many point to the individual fault of the
poor, the larger picture is lost and workable solutions are not considered. The nitmes, faces, and
stories of real famifies are what this issue is ultimately about. We are not discussing an issue that

we can watch on television and discount as someone else's problem. lVe are talking ahout the
lives of millions of people including children and a situation that will ultimately affect all of us in
one way or another.

A story written in the March issue of "USA Weekend" estimated that 35 million
Americans live in hunger or "food insecure" households. Millions of people cannot even provide
the basic necessify of food for themselves and their families. Ttre food banks of this country are

facing a crisis with the need of emergency food assistance rising L6To

n

L997. It is estimated

that one-two percent of the national budget goes to cash assistance for families, yet it remains to
be one of the largest areas of budgetary concern for American citizens. By placing blame on

individuals, we as a society can minimize olrr responsibility. Even if we ourselves never have to
rely on weHare, every other system in America will be influence by weHare reform. Whether it is
the criminal justice system, child protection, hospitals, food shelves, homeless shelters, or local
businesses and churches - we

will all be moved in some way, and until we realize that it will take

everyone to combat the issue of poverty we will fail miserably once again. Poverty still remains

high in our country, and yet we remain to claim that if millions of people have been able to find
jobs than those who fail to must have a lack of work ethic. Despite everything, it is believed that

poverty and dependency is not caused by stmctural conditions; rather, poverty is individual
moral tault.
As policymakers once again attempt to separate the deserrring from the undeserving
poor, decisions are made regarding who should be forced to rvork, who should be cutoff from
benefits, and who should be stigmatized. The weHare policy affempts moral reformation by
denying aid, reducing aid, requiring work, and stigmatizing recipients (Handler

& Hasenfeld,
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19971. The push to place persons in paid work and get them off of weHare by continuing with
means-tested benefits perpetuates the stigmatization of the

poor. Time limits and sanctions

continue the idea of punishment for those rryho lack "mora] character" and "work ethic". For
fhose who are "lazy" and "undeserving" work requirements replace cash assistance.
We could continue to discuss the problems with the world and the policies that attempt to

solve them hut we do not have the time to do so. Minnesota is dealing with the policy that has
been implemented and continues to look toward what can be done and what has been done. In

monthly newsletters sent out by the Minnesota Departrnent of Human Services, stories are told
about persons and families that have succeeded from MFIP-S and how their life has changed for
the better. Efforts that have been made such as transportation projects, child support

enforcement, employment connmtions, and community partrrerships that have produced
opportunities and increased accornplishment. People have donated time, money, clothing, food,
and services. We are a state that encompasses many individuals that want to rnake a difference
and are committed to bettming communities. What has been increasingly evident, is that

Minnesota has an obviously more generous approach than most if not all states.
As Minnesota continues to evaluate people's needs, plan for service delivery, and
implement services of employment and haining, it is increasinsly apparent that there

a.re

many

who will succeed but there are also many that have severe barriers and disadvantages to
competing for, getting and keeping jobs. Systemic issues are being addressed and will hopefully
he fine tuned as time piLsses, but most agree that rre do not have all the answers and may never

have. The ability for people to hegin work and not lose all their assistance is a major factor.
While welfare-to-work is an approach that has many worftable, realistic, flrrd generous aspects,
we need to remain cautious when catculating the balance of strategies of getting people

employed without denying them essential benefits which help them and their families to survive.

It must be realized that persons somehow came to the point of needing welfare support in
Minnesota for a variety of reasons and it will take a creativity of methods to get them back to

work. For some, the change in the system will be enough to move them into the work force but
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for others who have multiple bariers that hinder their ability to attain successful employment, a
more intense support and follow-up approach may be necessary.

If a model of attaching

persons to the lahor force and direct employment search and

placement is to be the Minnesota approach we must support these efforts consistently. It must be
more than just finding

a

job.

Vocational evaluations and career planning proc€sses must be

included- This will help the person develop long-range career development and self-sufficiency

goals. These career plans should include job goals that emphasize employment for which the
person has an aptness, he or she enjoys, is interested in, and can provide an income on which

they can realistically

live. In doing this, program$ will not only place people in jobs, it will help

them find jobs that they will stay in and make achievements in, jobs that make them content with

life and befter people who will raise happier, healthier children. Supports such as child care,
transportation, housing, and health care must be continued and modified as needed. Ttrese all

directly affect how successful an individual will be on the job.
Most importantly it must be remembered that every person deals with life differenfly and
has various conditions to face. Many are able to deal with big issues one at a time, but for people

moving from welfare to work, these issues all will need to be addressed simultaneously. The
more help and support they can receive during this time of fansition the better chance they

will

have in being successful long-term. The good news is that Minnesota needs an influx of

workers. If an effective partnership can be formed between employers, employees, Workforce
Centers, schools, human senrice organizations, and government, as well as a pooling

adminisEative, fiscal, and program resources a difference can be made.

of
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APPENDIX
Minnesota Family Investment Program-Statewide (MFIP-S)

ffnfumrim povtled by Hlelfue Refum Act Sumry,sls$n
Section

t

Esf,ablishing

IlMfffiiF

InvffiProgram

- Smeryide. (256LOl)

$ftd- l. Iaplementatftm of Itf,nmesota famity inveshenl lroEram

- stateryide.

Cites the Minnesota family investment plan statewide expansion of MFIP, with
cor:nties converting current AFDC cases by March 31, 1998.

&rH- 2. Irylerrprtmim of tcryorary assist'rnrefudy fedies (TAI{F)Specifies that Minnesota

will implement the federal TANF block grant through

a statewide e4pansion of MFm.

Subil 5- Corylimce SISem. Authorizes the commissioner of human services
to administer statewide compliance systems for TANF, food stamps, medical
assistance, general assistance medical care, emergency GA, child support,

preadmission screening and alternative care.
MEIP-S

Erybym€nt md ftaining

{Aspeffi rdfred to singb motrers who ue US- citi-nrrs, notpegnmt

40

d rnderfu

age of 20}

Cnmty &rries. (256J50)

ftbd- f - Fnpbyrmt ffid training servfo:es cmpmcnt of MIIPS- Praer4lh
(a) requires that counties, by Jan. 1, 1998, to develop and provide an

employment and training services component that is designed to put
participants on the most direct path to unsubsidized employment. Participation

in these services is mandatory for all nonexempt MFIP-S participants. Allows
exempt participants to volunteer for services.

prag34lh ft) altows a county to provide employment and training services to a
participant who is exempt from employment and haining services to a
participant who is exempt from employment and training hut volunteers.
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fubd- 5. Puticipm*m rc$drcmg rls for siqgb?uent cases. For
single-parent families participation is required within six months of receiving
assistance.

Suhd-

8. Cnmty drff

to ensure

eqrloyrmt d

tEnining

ctols fm

pryt*:bmts.
Requires a county, or a group of counties working cooperatively, to give a

participant a choice of at least two employment and faining service providers.
Exempts from this requirement are counties that utilize workforce centers that
use multiple providers, offer multiple options under a collaborative effort, and
can document that participants have choice.

$rbd- 9. f,rceflion; finqncial nuUsUb- Notwithstanding

subd. 8, exempts from

the requirernent to have more than one service provider are counties that

explain that having choice in service providers would be a financial hardship.

42

Oversiery of

erybymt d

tmining servil:es- (256I5f5) Requires

a

job counselor,

during the first meeting with a participant, to ensure that an overview of
employment and fraining services is provided. Specifies topics that must be
covered in this orientation.
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Asffissmcnnq

&ftd-

plms- (256L52)

f-

Applfoatfon limited to certain

puti*pmf.

Provides that this section

applies to MFIP-S participants who are not exempt from participating in

employment and training services, and to exempt participants who volunteer for
employment and training services.

Slftd-

A Initial AssessmetrL Puagraph (a) requires

the

job counselor to

assess

the participants ability to obtain and retain employment, based on the

participant's education level, prior employment or work experience, transferable

work skills and existing job markets.

Puagr4rh ft) requires the job counselor to determine if the participant needs

80
refresher courses for professional certification or licensure,

ffid to include
of

refresher courses in the job search support plan, provided the combination
courses and other activities total at least 40 hours per week.

Srftd- 3, Ioh searclf iob seffifr $Eptrt plan- Paragrflh (a) provides that if,
after the initial assessment, the job counselor determines that the participant is

likely to obtain suitable employment, the participant must conduct job search
for up to eight weeks, for at least 30 hours per week. Requires

a

job search

support plan to be developed, and specifies minimum content of the plan.
the end of

I weeks the participant has not obtained suitable employment,

If

at

the

participant must receive a secondary assessment.

faragr4h ft) provides that dr:ring the search period,

the panicipant or the joh

counselor can request a review of the participant's progress.
Subd-

a

Secnnrlry assessmeil Pa.agrflh (a) requires a secondary

assessment for participants who: (1) in the

barriers to employmentthat

a

job counselor's judgment, have

job search support plan will not overcome; (2)

have completed eight weeks of job search without obtaining suitable
employment; or (3) have not received a secondary assessment, provided the
participant is working as least 20 hours per week and the participant, job
counselor, or county agellcy requests an assessment.

Pragra1fr fu) specifies what must be evaluated in the secondary assessment.
AIso requires the job counselor to use the results of the secondary assessment to
develop an employment plan under subd. 5.
Paragraph (c) requires the provider to inform participants about additional

vendors or resources that provide employment and training services that may
be available to the participant as part of an employment plan.
Subd-

5. EmplDymtnt plm; cmlents-

Requires the job counselor and

participant to develop an employment plan that includes specific activities that
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are tied to an employment goal and are designed to move the panicipant along

the most direct path to unsubsidized employment. Also provides that the plan
must list the specific steps that will he taken to obtain employment, and a

timetable for the completion of each step. Gives the pa.rticipant the option to
choose vendors and resources selected by the job counselor.

fubd- 7- Revlsfon of plm- Requires

a

job counselor to work with

a participant

to revise the job search support plan or employment plan, as appropriate, if the
participant has lost or quit
address the reason for

a

job for good cause. Requires the plan revision to

job loss. Allows the participant, counselor, or agency to

request a secondary assessment
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Bommary

educatiq

limturrion-e

$ftd- 1- I^eilgfr of pogrerr-

if one has not been performed.

m ryoval }lb $ef,rh reqtft€mcnts- (256I-53)
Generally limits approved post-secondary

education or training programs to 12 months or less. Also requires the
participant to meet the requirements of subd. 2 arrd

3.

Provides that a program

lasting up to 24 months maybe approved as an exception if the conditions
specified in subd. 2 to 4 are met. Prohibits a panicipant from being approved

for more than a total of 24 months of post-secondary education of training.
Subd-

2- Ilocrmeatelim $mutlns 1rogrffi-

Provides that a post-secondary

education or taining program can only be approved if the specified
documentation supporting the need for the program is provided.

fubil 3- Sfltidacfiory 1rogress rcqtre*

Provides that a post-secondary

education or taining program can only be an approved activity if the
participant maintains satisfactory progress in the program. Defines "satisfactory
progress".

*fid- 4- E€pn5rment

of

eryhymt ild

tEaining

asslme-

Provides that a

program lasting between 13 and 24 months can only be approved if the
panicipant agrees to repay the amount of employment and training funds paid
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by the county to support the second year of education or training. Requires the
participant and county to develop a mutually acceptable repayment plan.
Specifies that the loan is interest-free, and that the loan is in repayment status

when the participanil (1) completes the program and obtains suitable

employment

at"

L50To or more of the of the poverty level; or (2) leaves the

program before completion and obtains suitable employment at LSWI or more

of the poverfy level.

fubd- 5. Job seilEh nftErcoryHimof pos*-smdry efrrcdfonatreiningAllows three months of job search foltorrdng completion of a post-secondary
education or training program. Requires the employment plan to state the
estimated completion date of the program. Requires the participant to accept
any offer of suitable employment

af,t€tr

the three month job search period

expires.

#

Putfoipmtrcqrrirtm€G dfhils,
&lbd- 1.

d

e,ryectat*ms- (256155)

Cryliffice wilh eryhyrsrtplm; ruitrhh eryhSnrsrt- Paragreh

(a) requires an MFIP-S participant to comply with the terms of the participant's

employment plan. Requires the participant to conduct job search (if the
participant has completed an education progftlm) and then to accept any
suitahle employment once the steps in the employment plan have been

completed. Gives the panicipant the option of choosing to accept suitable
employment before the plan's steps are completed.

EilEgr4lh (c) provides that faih:re to develop or comply with a job search
support or employment plan, or quitting suitable employment without good
cause, will result in the imposition of a sanction under section 256J.46.

slhd- 2. Ihfiy to repffit Requires the participant to inform

the

job counselor

qdthin 3 workings days regarding any changes that are related to the
participant's employment status.
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Subd-

5. qflim

to,

rrtilize erieling

plm- Allows

a participant to use a

job

seilch support or employment plan developed in other programs with job
counselor approval, provided the plan meets or is modified to meet MFIP-S
requirements.

tl

ild

Fqlloymmt

haining selrfures cmpffi€ats; exerylms- (256156)- Provides that

the following MFIP-S caregivers are exempt from the employment and

taining

requirements:

(1)

a person age 60 or older

(2)

a person who is prevented,

by a cenified permanent or tempora.ry illness, injury

or incapacrty that is expected to continue for more than 30 days, from obtaining
or retaining employment.

(3)

a person required

certified io U*

(4)

a caregiver

care

(5)

in the home to care for a household member professionally

ill or incapacitated.

for a child under one year of age who personally provides full-time

for the child (only claimed for lZ months in a kfetime).

a person who is employed at lea.st 40 hours per week,

or 30 hours per week

with 10 additional hours of job search.

(6)

a person experiencing a personal or

family crisis who is incapable of program

panicipation.
Requires a caregiver exempt hecause of caring for a child under L2 weeks to attend an early

childhood and family education class, a parenting class, or some similar activity, if available,
during the exemption period. Failure to attend the activrty will not result in a sanction.
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Good cnrsq

faihrcto corytf nottg

miliatlm

cmfercoce-

(?ffiI5fi

Stftd- 1- Cffid cflrse fm faihrre to coryly. Provides that a panicipant may
claim good cau.se for failing to comply with requirements of the orientation or the employment
and training component when one of the following conditions exists:

(1)

appropriate child care is not available
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job does not meet the definition of suitable employment

(21

the

(3)

the participant is

(4)

the participant must care for an

ill or injured

ill or disabled family member and the care

prevents the participant from complying with the participant's plan

(s)

necessary fransportation is not available

(6)

an emergency arises that prevents compliance with the participant's plan

(7)

compliance with the participant's plan conflicts with judicial proc*edings

(8)

the participant is already participating in acceptable work activities

(e)

activities in the participant's plan are not available

(10)

suitable employment is not available

(L2l

the panicipant documents other impediments to compliance that are beyond the

participant's control.

$ftil 2. Not*E of itttent to sffiirm- Paregr4h (e) specifies

the procedures

that must be followed when a nonexempt participant fail.s, without good cause,

to comply with employment and training services requirements. Requires the
participant to receive a notice of intent to sanction, and, when applicable, a
notice of adverse action, and specifies the content of the notice.

Pragrryh (b) permits a participant to request

a

conciliation conference, and sets

out the procedures for requesting such a conference. Requires the job
counselor's supervisor or the supervisor's designee to review the outcome of the

conference. Provides that if the conciliation conference resolves the
noncompliance, the county egency must be promptly informed and the sanction
notice withdrawn.

Pragrryh (c) permits a participant to request

a

fair hearing instead of a

conciliation conference. In such cases, prohihits a county from requiring a
conciliation conference prior to the fair hearing.

Pragr4fr

(d) provides that

if a participant

request a fair hearing or conciliation

l(
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conference, sanctions will not be imposed until there is a determination of

noncompliance. Requires sanctions to be imposed as provided under section
256J"46.

%

Smrrims (256L45)
&rbd- f . Sffiims for pulicipmts not

crylying

wiih

Imgrm

requfu€mcnts

Puagraph (a) provides that an MFIP-S participants who fails, without good
cause, to comply with program requirements other than the child support

cooperation requirements is subjected to a sanction under this subdivision.
Makes a sanction effective 10 days after the required notice is given. Provides
that each month a participant fails to comply ydth a requirement is considered a
separate occturence of noncompliance. A participant who has been sanctioned

must remain in sanction to be considered a first occurrence.

PuagrflFh (h) specifies sanctions. For the first occurrence of noncomp[iance, a
participant's grant is reduced by 10 percent of the applicable transitional
standard. The sanction is required to be in effect for at

lea^st

one month. The

sanction is removed only when the participant is in compliance.
For a second or subsequent
occurrence, a participant's rent, and, at county option, utilities, are vendor paid
up to the amount of the participant's grant. The residual amount of the grant
that is left after vendor paying rent and utilities is reduced by 30 percent of the

applicable transitional standard.
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